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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ESSAYS ON INTERGENERATIONAL AND REGIONAL ASPECTS OF WATER 
MANAGEMENT 
by 
Yu Chen 
Florida International University, 2014 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Mahadev Bhat, Major Professor 
This dissertation consists of three essays on different aspects of water 
management. The first essay focuses on the sustainability of freshwater use by 
introducing the notion that altruistic parents do bequeath economic assets for their 
offspring. Constructing a two-period, over-lapping generational model, an optimal ratio 
of consumption and pollution for old and young generations in each period is determined. 
Optimal levels of water consumption and pollution change according to different 
parameters, such as, altruistic degree, natural recharge rate, and population growth. The 
second essay concerns water sharing between countries in the case of trans-boundary 
river basins. The paper recognizes that side payments fail to forge water-sharing 
agreement among the international community and that downstream countries have weak 
bargaining power.  An interconnected game approach is developed by linking the water 
allocation issue with other non-water issues such as trade or border security problems, 
creating symmetry between countries in bargaining power. An interconnected game 
forces two countries to at least partially cooperate under some circumstances. The third 
essay introduces the concept of virtual water (VW) into a traditional international trade 
vii 
model in order to estimate water savings for a water scarce country.  A two country, two 
products and two factors trade model is developed, which includes not only consumers 
and producer’s surplus, but also environmental externality of water use.  The model 
shows that VW trade saves water and increases global and local welfare.  This study 
should help policy makers to design appropriate subsidy or tax policy to promote water 
savings especially in water scarce countries.   
viii 
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CHAPTER 1                                                                                     
PARENTAL ALTRUISM IN FRESHWATER MANAGEMENT 
1.1. Introduction 
Population growth, industrial development and attendant pollution put increasing 
stress on freshwater. Water becomes a locally scare resource at most places on earth 
(Ambec and Sprumont, 2002). Freshwater is a scarce resource and can be non-renewable 
if not managed properly. Only around 0.9% of the total water on earth is ground water 
and 0.009% is surface water, especially the fossil water. In the world's driest places, fossil 
water is becoming as valuable as fossil fuel. These water sources are highly vulnerable to 
excessive consumption and pollution by the current generation.  For instance, countries in 
North Africa receive little rain, and its population is concentrated on the coasts, where 
groundwater reserves are becoming increasingly brackish and nearing depletion. The 
NASA observations found that humans are using more water than rains can replenish, 
and area groundwater levels declined by an average of one foot (30 centimeters) per year 
between 2002 and 2008 (www.nasa.org). Palmer (2007) predicts that 190/292, and Milly 
et al. (2005) predict that 97/152 of the rivers will face droughts in 2060, and the majority 
of the rivers they simulated may face reduction in water flows. 
It is fairly common that individuals and societies bequeath economic, cultural 
and natural resources to future generations for altruistic reasons.  The effort by the current 
generation to protect and save fresh water will directly affect its availability for the future 
generation. Both the quantity and quality of the water are equally important. Existing 
literature on freshwater management mainly concerns water consumption and regulations 
for one generation or particular regions (Frisvold and Caswell, 1995). There are a limited 
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number of studies that consider overlapping intergenerational allocation in water 
consumption and pollution. Stephan (1996) separate overlapping generations (OLG) and 
infinitely lived agent (ILA) and argues that OLG should be adopted when it comes to the 
economics of global warming. John and Pechinino (1994) study overlapping 
intergenerational aspects of water consumption and pollution in a single period of time 
under certain limited circumstances.  By extending the above models, this study attempts 
to address some of the key research questions: (i) does the parental altruism matter for the 
intergenerational water allocation? (ii) which economic factors (e.g., interest rate, wages, 
costs of pollution control, etc.), demographic factors (e.g., population growth rate), and 
environmental factors (e.g., water recharge rate, pollution assimilation rate, etc.) are the 
strongest predictors of parental altruism behavior?  (iii) are there any policy approaches 
for improving altruistic behavior especially when under growing water shortage driven 
by demographic and natural factors? 
The model of parental (current generation's) altruism developed in the study 
includes both quantity and quality aspects of freshwater.  The study uses an approach 
similar to Jouvet, et al (2000), but with different constraints.  The present model consists 
of an infinite-horizon economy with altruistic individuals living for two periods, a firm 
and two goods, one of which is a public good, i.e., water, and the other is a private good 
produced by the firm.  The production of private good requires not only neoclassic 
production inputs (labor and capital), but also water resources.  Individuals only work 
and earn wages in the first period during which they only consume water and save 
income. Then they retire in the second period during which they consume both water and 
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the private good, leave some amount of water valued by the market water price, and 
voluntarily contribute some money to improve water quality.  Households obtain utility 
from consuming both goods and suffer disutility by pollution in the second period.  Since 
individuals are retired in the second period, the pollution can be only from the first period. 
A representative parent tries to maximize the sum of utility from water 
consumption over his or her lifetime and an altruistic value derived from water 
bequeathed to his/her offspring, net of disutility from pollution from income-earning 
activity.  This maximization is subject to income constraint, physical water constraint and 
pollution constraint.  I characterize the effects of population growth, net recharge rate, 
degree of altruism, and the marginal utility from consumption or disutility from pollution 
on inter-generational water allocation. Next, individual parent’s intergenerational 
decision will be integrated into a social planner’s problem in order to characterize an 
inter-generational social equilibrium path for water allocation.  I demonstrate the effect of 
climate uncertainty on the inter-generational water allocation by conducting a 
comparative static analysis of water recharge rate. 
The current study provides the following key results: the last unit of pollution 
brings less disutility to households when the natural pollutant absorption rate is high. The 
more altruistic the parents are, the higher the marginal disutility they suffer from 
pollution. The higher the discount rate, the more satisfaction parents will have from the 
last unit of water consumption. The more altruistic the parents are or the faster the 
population grows, the less water they will consume in the first period. If the net water 
recharge rate is high, the marginal utility from consuming water in the first period could 
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go down.  Similar results are found for marginal utility of water consumption in the 
second period. Additional findings are that when the water market price increases in the 
second period, parents get more satisfaction consuming the last unit of water in the same 
period, and net recharge rate has ambiguous effect on the marginal utility for the second 
period. The results of the social planner’s problem closely mirror that of the individual’s 
problem above.  Based on the above results, paper makes policy recommendations for 
improving altruistic behavior especially against climate-driven uncertainty in recharge 
rates and market-driven private water consumption behavior. 
The rest of the paper is organizes as follows. In Section 1.2, I use OLG model 
for the Individual’s optimal problem. Social planner’s optimal problem is derived in 
Section 1.3, and some policies are suggested. The Last section will conclude. 
1.2. Model 
The model consists of an infinite-horizon economy with altruistic individuals 
living for two periods and a perfect competitive firm.  The firm requires not only the 
neoclassic production inputs, labor (ܮ) and capital (ܭ), but also water resources (ܺ). 
Production function is denoted as ௧ܻ ൌ ݂ሺܭ௧, ܮ௧, ܺ௧ሻ ൌ ܮ௧݂	ሺ௄೟௅೟ ,
௑೟
௅೟ሻ, and per capita output 
is ݕ௧ ൌ ݂	ሺ݇௧, ݔ௧ሻ , where ݕ௧ ൌ ௒೟௅೟  is the output-labor ratio, 		݇௧ ൌ
௄೟
௅೟  is the capital-labor 
ratio, and ݔ௧ ൌ ௑೟௅೟ is the natural resource-labor ratio. f is twice continuously differentiable, 
positive, increasing, and strictly concave. I categorize the water use into two major 
groups: the use for producers (ܺ ) and consumers (ܥଶሻ . The water consumption of 
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households is assumed to be the water use for public supply and domestic use. Firms are 
to maximize their profit in the competitive market: 
݉ܽݔ௄,௅,௑ ߨ௧ ൌ ௧ܻ െ ݎ௧ܭ௧ െ ݓ௧ܮ௧       (1.1) 
Subject to  
௧ܻ ൌ ܮ௧݂	ሺ௄೟௅೟ ,
௑೟
௅೟ሻ         (1.2) 
Where r୲ is the interest rate, w୲ is the wage at which the labor gets paid. Water is used for 
free, and therefore, there is no cost for water in the profit function. However, it does not 
mean water can be used without any restriction. Water use by firm is constrained in later 
individual’s problem. In this market, each factor is paid its marginal product: 
	ݎ௧ ൌ ௞݂ሺ݇௧, ݔ௧ሻ, ݓ௧ ൌ ݂ሺ݇௧, ݔ௧ሻ െ ݇௧ ௞݂ሺ݇௧, ݔ௧ሻ െ ݔ௧ ௫݂ሺ݇௧, ݔ௧ሻ,  
where ௞݂ሺ݇௧, ݔ௧ሻ ൌ డ௙ሺ.ሻడ௞೟ , ௫݂ሺ݇௧, ݔ௧ሻ ൌ
డ௙ሺ.ሻ
డ௫೟ .  
1.2.1 Individual’s problem 
There are N homogeneous individuals in this economy, and they live for two periods with 
a constant population growth rate n, ௧ܰାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ ௧ܰ. Each individual supplies one unit 
of labor inelastically. In the equilibrium, ௧ܰ ൌ ܮ௧ . The population growth n could be 
either positive or negative for in most developing countries, population growth is positive 
and many developed countries have negative population growth. Whether or not 
population growth matters for the altruism is one of the key research concerns. The 
individuals not only derive utility from consuming water c୲ଶ when they are young and 
c୲ାଵଶ  when they are old for free. They also gain utility from the private good consumption 
while young (in the first period), c୲ାଵଵ , and old (the second period) c୲ାଵଵ .  Previous studies 
(e.g., Karp et al., 2012) focus on altruism on pollution abatement, consumption of private 
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goods, but not consumption of water. Individuals also derive disutility from the pollution 
when they are old, P୲ାଵ. Generations only earn wages in the first period and consume in 
the second period (for the private goods). Following Agnani et al. (2005) we assume that 
households suffer disutility by pollution in the second period.  Since individuals are 
retired in the second period, they produce goods and cause pollution only in the first 
period. Additive concave utility function can represent these preferences: 
ܷ൫ܿ௧,௬ଵ , ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ , ܿ௧,௬ଶ , ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଶ , ௧ܲାଵ൯ ൌ ݑ൫ܿ௧,௬ଵ , ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ , ܿ௧,௬ଶ , ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଶ ൯ ൅ ݒ	ሺ ௧ܲାଵሻ	  (1.1)    
Where ௖ܷ ൒ 0, ܷ௉ ൑ 0, ௖ܷ௖ ൑ 0, ܷ௣௣ ൑ 0 and the cross-derivatives, ௖ܷ௉ and ܷ௉௖ are zero. 
For the individuals, their optimal problem is to not only maximize their own net utility, 
but their offspring’s. And ߚ  is the utility discount rate, but also denotes the 
intergenerational degree of altruism, ߚ߳	ሾ0,1ሿ. The higher ߚ is, the more the parents value 
their offspring’s utility, or the more they care about the children.  Formally, the 
individual’s problem is to maximize 
௧ܸ ൌ ܷ൫ܿ௧,௬ଵ , ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ , ܿ௧,௬ଶ , ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଶ , ௧ܲାଵ൯ ൅ ߚ ௧ܸାଵ ൌ∑ ߚ௦ି௧ାஶ௦ୀ௧ ܷ൫ܿ௦,௬ଵ , ܿ௦ାଵ,௢ଵ , ܿ௦,௬ଶ , ܿ௦ାଵ,௢ଶ , ௦ܲାଵ൯	
           (1.2) 
Subject to 
ݏ௧ ൌ ݓ௧ ൅݉௧ െ ܿ௧,௬ଵ 											        (1.3) 
ܴ௧ାଵݏ௧ ൌ ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ ൅ ݖ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݉௧ାଵ	      (1.4) 
௧ܹାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ߱ሻ ௧ܹ െ ௧ܰܿ௧,௬ଶ െ ௧ܰିଵܿ௧,଴ଶ െ ௧ܲ െ ܺ௧	     (1.5) 
௧ܲାଵ ൌ ߮ ௧ܻାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ௧ܲ െ ܾܼ̅௧ାଵ െ ܾݖ௧ାଵ,				ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൐ 0				   (1.6) 
ܽ௧ା௜ ൒ 0,							݅ ൌ 0,1,2,…∞			        (1.7) 
ݖ௧ା௜ ൒ 0,							݅ ൌ 0,1,2, …∞				       (1.8) 
݉௧ା௜ ൒ 0,							݅ ൌ 0,1,2, …∞				       (1.9) 
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௧ܰܿ௧,௬ଶ ൌ ܿ௧,௬ଶ ൅ ሺ ௧ܰ െ 1ሻܿ௧̅,௬ଶ          (1.10) 
௧ܰିଵܿ௧,଴ଶ ൌ ܿ௧,଴ଶ ൅ ሺ ௧ܰିଵ െ 1ሻܿ௧̅,଴ଶ        (1.11) 
In the first period (equation (1.5)), young altruists save ݏ௧ from the wage they earn 
from work ݓ௧  and monetary heritage from his/her ancestor ݉௧  net the private good 
consumption ܿ௧ଵ. When those altruists grow old in the second period (equation (1.6)), they 
spend all their savings from the first period and interest ܴ௧ାଵݏ௧  on the private good 
consumption ܿ௧ାଵଵ , pollution abatement ݖ௧ାଵ, and monetary bequest ݉௧ାଵ, which is non 
negative, to their offspring with a population growth rate n. The water naturally recharges 
in each period at a constant net rate ω, the source of which can be local natural recharge 
or import from offsite.  Equations (1.5) and (1.6) can be combined to form ܴ௧ାଵሺݓ௧ ൅
݉௧ െ ܿ௧,௬ଵ ሻ ൌ ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ ൅ ݖ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݉௧ାଵ, which is the bequest constraint. Altruists not 
only care about the monetary bequest to their offspring, but also concern natural resource, 
water. Therefore, they contribute to water pollution abatement on the one hand; on the 
other hand, they physically save water for the next generations. Equation (1.7) represents 
the future water physical stock that will be left after current period consumption by young 
and old generations, use in production, and loss as a result of pollution and addition 
because of the net recharge. ௧ܰܿ௧,௬ଶ ൌ ܿ௧,௬ଶ ൅ ሺ ௧ܰ െ 1ሻܿ௧̅,௬ଶ  and ௧ܰିଵܿ௧,଴ଶ ൌ ܿ௧,଴ଶ ൅ ሺ ௧ܰିଵ െ
1ሻܿ௧̅,଴ଶ  means that the total water consumption consists of an individual’s consumption 
and the rest of the population’s consumption, population times the average individual 
consumption level. 
Pollution is generated from two sources: industry and households. The EPA 
(Environmental Protection Agency) had identified point source, of which 80% is 
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industrial sources and 20% were municipal discharge. The term ݖ௧ାଵ is the contribution to 
the pollution abatement by an individual, and ܼ̅௧ାଵ is how much the ones other than this 
individual contribute to abate the pollution. Individual’s decision of whether or not to 
abate pollution is independent with each other, hence, they contribute ݖ௧ to the pollution 
abatement, considering the others contribute ܼ̅௧ାଵ. Dynamic pollution change is captured 
by P୲ାଵ ൌ φY୲ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ αሻP୲ െ bZത୲ାଵ െ bz୲ାଵ . Pollution is accumulated by linear 
technology production and past pollution netting the pollution abatement from the 
individuals’ contribution, which is also linear technology. Pollution results from 
production of industry at time t and is assumed to be linearly related to production with 
parameter	߮: ߮ ௧ܻ. A portion of the pollution naturally degrades at constant rate α.  
Empirically water price is usually underestimated since marginal user cost is not 
included. In my model, however, water price could be efficient since marginal user 
cost/water scarcity rent is considered, which is represented by the shadow price. Water 
price increases over time, not only because the scarcity rent rises over time, but also 
because as population grows each period, larger water project needs to be built, and 
higher operation and other fees will be applied.  
To ensure that the economy and environment are sustainable, condition 
ߩ௧ାଵ ௧ܹାଵ ൒ ߩ௧ ௧ܹ is imposed. Scarcity rent should be considered in the water price. That 
is, the less the available water, the higher the economic value of water is. The more water 
bequest for the future, the slower the water price rises. 
Since firms borrow money from household’s savings, market clears at ሺ1 ൅
݊ሻ݇௧ାଵ ൌ ݏ௧ . In the model, monetary bequest, water bequest and pollution are state 
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variables and all consumptions are control variables. Optimality conditions and results 
are developed in Appendix A. 
Result 1: 
௎೎೟,೤భ
௎೎೟శభ,೚భ
ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ ൒ 1	݋ݎ	ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵܿ௧,௬ଵ   
Proposition 1: MRS (Marginal Rate of Substitution) of individual’s consumption 
when they are young and old is equal to the interest rate factor. In another word, at the 
same level of utility, individual would give up amount of ܴ௧ାଵ units of the private good 
consumption when they are old to obtain one unit of consumption when they are young. 
Therefore, individuals would prefer to consume the private good when they are old. And 
the higher the interest rate, the more individuals would prefer to consume when old. 
Especially when the utility function is CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion) and in 
the form of natural logarithm, individuals prefer to consume the private good more when 
they are old, which is consumption when they are young plus the interest.  
Result 2: 
ఉ௎೎೟,೤మ
௎೎೟శభ,೚మ
ൌ ఘ೟శభఘ೟శమ 	݋ݎ	ߚߩ௧ାଶܿ௧ାଵ,௢
ଵ ൌ ܿ௧,௬ଵ ߩ௧ାଵ  
Proposition 2: the discounted Marginal Rate of Substitution of the water 
consumption for individuals when they are young and old equals to the ratio of the water 
shadow price. The higher the shadow price ratio, the more of water consumption 
individuals have to give up for when they are old to obtain same amount of water 
consumption when they are young, Ceteris Paribas. The lower of discount rate, or the less 
altruistic the individuals are, they would like to give up more future consumption to their 
current consumption, Ceteris Paribas. If the utility function is CRRA and in the form of 
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natural logarithm, the discounted value of water consumption of individuals when they 
are old equates the value of water consumption when they are young.  
Result 3: ܷ௖೟శభ,೚మ െ ܷ௉೟శభ ൌ ߚ߭௧ାଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߚଶ߭௧ାଶ	 
Proposition 3: the net marginal benefit (marginal benefit from water 
consumption nets the marginal cost of water pollution) is the discounted value of the 
difference of shadow prices of pollution between two periods. The higher natural 
absorption rate (ߙ) is, the higher net marginal benefit is.    
Result 4: ሺ1 ൅ ωሻܷ௖೟శభ,೚మ ൑ ܷ௖೟,೤మ  or ሺ1 ൅ ωሻ ൑
௎೎೟,೤మ
௎೎೟శభ,೚మ
 
Proposition 4: MRS of water consumption of one generation between two 
periods depends on the natural net recharge rate of water. The higher the net recharge 
rate, the more water consumption at old individuals have to give up for the water 
consumption at young, keeping the same utility level. When physical water bequest is 
operative, ሺ1 ൅ ωሻ ൌ
௎೎೟,೤మ
௎೎೟శభ,೚మ
  and when physical water bequest is not operative, ሺ1 ൅
ωሻ ൏
௎೎೟,೤మ
௎೎೟శభ,೚మ
  . Therefore, individuals are more likely to consume water when they are old 
than that when they are young, when the water bequest is not operative. On the one hand, 
no water bequest from their forefather, they would have to consume less at young age. 
On the other hand, they do not have to leave water for their offspring, hence, they could 
consume more when they are old. 
Result 5 : ܷ௖೟,೤భ െ
ଵା௡
ఉ ܷ௖೟,೚భ ൑ 0 or 
௎೎೟,೚భ
௎೎೟,೤భ
൒ ఉଵା௡ 
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Proposition 5: MRS of private good consumption between two generations 
depends on the altruistic degree and population growth. If the individual is more altruistic 
(higher ߚ), then he/she has to give up more of consuming for their offspring in the 
exchange of consuming for themselves. Therefore, it is intuitive that individual tends to 
leave more private good to the next generation when they are more altruistic. When the 
population growth rate increases, future generation will have to consume less on average 
if the parents’ altruism degree stays the same level. 
Steady state solutions vary in different scenarios when specific objective 
function form is given (see in Appendix A): 
1) Contribution to pollution abatement is not operative (z=0, then 
ܾ ൐ ஦ఊሺఉାఋሻ
భషಓ୅ఌష಍శభቀభషഄషഊೢ ቁ
಍షಓሺఉሻ
భ
భషഄ൫ఌఉାఌఋିఋሺଵିఉఌିఒሻ൯ಓ௟௡௉೟೘ೌೣ
஑ሺଵା௡ሻమశ
಍
భషഄሺଵିఊିఎሻሺଵିఉఌିఒሻ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ
≡ ܾ) 
a. When monetary bequest is operative (β ൐ ஔሺଵିகି஛ሻகሺଵାஔሻ ≡ β) 
Result 6: ఉோ೟శభଵା௡ ߠ௧ାଵ ൌ ߠ௧ 
 Proposition 6: When the monetary bequest is operative, no matter whether the 
contribution to abatement or water bequest applies or not, the opportunity cost of 
monetary bequest is high in the future if there is fast population growth, or low altruistic 
degree, or low interest rate in the last period. Also, if the future monetary bequest has 
higher opportunity cost, altruists prefer to slow down the consumption of the private good 
now. The marginal rate of substitution of consumption between future and now depends 
positively on the population growth rate and negatively on the altruistic degree and 
current interest rate. 
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Result 7: k∗ ൌ ଵିఌିఒఌ௪ ቀ
ఉ
ଵା௡ቁ
భ
భషഄ ܴ ഄభషഄ 
                m∗ ൌ ௪ଵିఌିఒ ቀߝ െ
ఋሺଵିఉఌିఒሻ
ఉାఋ ቁ  
                P∗ ൌ ஦஑ Aߝିக ቀ
ଵିఌିఒ
௪ ቁ
கି஛ ቀ ఉଵା௡ቁ
಍
భషഄ ܴ ഄ
಍
భషഄ ቀߝ െ ఋሺଵିఉఌିఒሻఉାఋ ቁ
஛
  
Proposition 7: since డ௠
∗
డఉ ൌ
௪
ଵିఌିఒ ቀ
ఋሺଵିఒሻାఋమఌ
ሺఉାఋሻమ ቁ ൐ 0, then when monetary bequest 
is operative, the more altruistic the parents are, the more monetary bequest they are 
willing to leave to their offspring.  
Proposition 8: since డ௞
∗
డఉ ൐ 0, then when monetary bequest is applicable, the more 
altruistic the parents are, the more capital level will be because individuals will save more 
to leave bequest to the next generation.  
Water pollution or pollution abatement relies on natural assimilation and private 
good production without individual’s contribution.  
a.1 when the water bequest is operative (W>0) 
ߚሺ1 ൅ ߱ሻ ൌ ߩ௧ାଵߩ௧ାଶ ൌ
ߚܷ௖೟,೤మ
ܷ௖೟శభ,೚మ
 
Proposition 9: Hoteling’s Rule applies (see the proof in the appendix A) when 
water bequest is operative. Water price increases over time as the recharge rate drops 
(during the drought year/years), or when people are less altruistic. When there is higher 
recharge rate, additional water consumption of the young generation brings more addition 
utility for them, as they do not have to worry too much about their future water 
consumption 
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Figure 1-1. Shadow price ration over time (modified Hoteling’s Rule) 
In figure 1-1, the 45 degree line is obtained when shadow prices are equal over 
time, ߩ௧ ൌ ߩ௧ାଵ.  The dashed line captures the shadow price ratio over time as water 
becomes scarce, the slope of scarcity rent ratio line (the dash line) is above 45 degree and 
sustainability condition enforces ఘ೟శమఘ೟శభ which is represented by the arc with arrows below 
the line of ଵఉሺଵାఠሻ. In this case, ܹ∗ ൌ
ଵ
ఠ ሺ ௧ܰܿ௬ଶ∗ ൅ ௧ܰିଵܿ଴ଶ∗ ൅ ܲ∗ ൅ ܺ∗ሻ 
 a.2 when the water bequest is non-operative (W=0) 
               Proposition 10: The sustainability constraint is automatically satisfied. However, 
water might become scarce in this case if the natural net recharge is not sufficient enough 
to reach the consumption level and pollution level.  
 
	t1
t
1
(1)
t1  t
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Figure 1-2 Shadow price ratio shift when net recharge rate decreases. 
The price momentum line tilts to the right when there is no physical water 
bequest. Future price is lower than the one when there is water bequest, ceteris paribus.  
b. When monetary bequest is non-operative (ߚ ൑ ఋሺଵିఌିఒሻఌሺଵାఋሻ ≡ ߚ) 
݉∗ ൌ 0 and ݇∗ ൌ ሺଵା௡ሻఌఊఋሺଵା௡ሻఌఊఋିோ೟ሺଵିఌିఒሻାሺଵା௡ሻఌమఊ 
b.1. when the water bequest is operative (W>0) 
ܲ∗ ൌ ߮ߙ ܣ݇
∗ఌݔ∗ఒ 
ܹ∗ ൌ 1߱ ሺ ௧ܰܿ௬
ଶ∗ ൅ ௧ܰିଵܿ଴ଶ∗ ൅ ܲ∗ ൅ ܺ∗ሻ 
      b.2. when the water bequest is non-operative (W=0) 
௧ܰܿ௬ଶ∗ ൅ ௧ܰିଵܿ଴ଶ∗ ൅ ܲ∗ ൅ ܺ∗ ൌ 0 
2) When contribution to pollution abatement is operative (z>0, then 
െࢼࣂ࢚శ૚૚ା࢔ ൅ ܾߚ߭௧ାଵሾ ௧ܰሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ െ 1ሿ െ ߚ߭௧ାଵ ൌ 0) 
a. When monetary bequest is operative (ߚ ൐ ሺଵିఌሻఌ െ
ఊ
ఌ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ
≡ ߚ) 
	t1
t
1
(1)
t1  t
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ܲ∗ ൌ ିሺଵିఊିఎሻ
ሾఉమ ആഁ೎బ,೤మ ೗೙೎೟,೤మ೘ೌೣቂ
భ
ഁሺభశഘሻቃ
೟శభାഁഇ೟శభషሺభషഀሻഁమഇ೟శమሾ್ಿ೟ሺభశ೙ሻష್షభሿሺభశ೙ሻሿ௟௡௉೟
೘ೌೣ  
a.1. when the water bequest is operative (W>0). 
ܹ߱∗ ൌ
௧ܰ
ఎ
ആ
೎బ,೤మ ೗೙೎೟,೤మ೘ೌೣ
ቂ భഁሺభశഘሻቃ
೟௟௡௖మ೘ೌೣ
െ ௧ܰ ఎሺଵା௡ሻ ആഁ೎బ,೤మ ೗೙೎೟,೤మ೘ೌೣቂ
భ
ഁሺభశഘሻቃ
೟శభ௟௡௖మ೘ೌೣ
൅
ିሺଵିఊିఎሻ
ሾఉమ ആഁ೎బ,೤మ ೗೙೎೟,೤మ೘ೌೣቂ
భ
ഁሺభశഘሻቃ
೟శభାഁഇ೟శభషሺభషഀሻഁమഇ೟శమሾ್ಿ೟ሺభశ೙ሻష್షభሿሺభశ೙ሻሿ௟௡௉೟
೘ೌೣ െ ௧ܰ ቀ
௪೟భషഄோ೟ഄ
஺ఌഄሺଵିఌିఒሻభషഄቁ
ଵ/ఒ
 
 a.2. when the water bequest is non-operative (W=0). ௧ܰܿ௬ଶ∗ ൅ ௧ܰିଵܿ଴ଶ∗ ൅ ܲ∗ ൅
ܺ∗ ൌ 0 
b. When monetary bequest is non-operative ( ߚ ൐ ሺଵିఌሻఌ െ
ఊ
ఌ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ
≡ ߚ ).  
ݖ∗ ൌ ሺଵା௡ሻሺଵିఒାఋఌሻ௪ିఋோ௪ሺଵିఌିఒሻଵିఌିఒ  
݇∗ ൌ ఌ௪ோሺଵିఌିఒሻ and ݉∗ ൌ 0 
         b.1. when the water bequest is operative (W>0) 
ܹ߱∗ ൌ ௧ܰ ߟߟ
ܿ଴,௬ଶ ݈݊ܿ௧,௬ଶ௠௔௫ ൤
1
ߚሺ1 ൅ ߱ሻ൨
௧
݈݊ܿଶ௠௔௫
െ ௧ܰ ߟ
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ ߟߚܿ଴,௬ଶ ݈݊ܿ௧,௬ଶ௠௔௫ ൤
1
ߚሺ1 ൅ ߱ሻ൨
௧ାଵ
݈݊ܿଶ௠௔௫
 
൅ െሺ1 െ ߛ െ ߟሻ
ሾߚଶ ߟߚܿ଴,௬ଶ ݈݊ܿ௧,௬ଶ௠௔௫ ൤
1
ߚሺ1 ൅ ߱ሻ൨
௧ାଵ
൅ ߚߠ௧ାଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߚଶߠ௧ାଶሾܾ ௧ܰሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ െ ܾ െ 1ሿሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻሿ݈݊ ௧ܲ
௠௔௫
െ ௧ܰ ቆ ݓ௧
ଵିఌܴ௧ఌ
ܣߝఌሺ1 െ ߝ െ ߣሻଵିఌቇ
ଵ/ఒ
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         b.2. when the water bequest is non-operative (W=0)  
௧ܰܿ௬ଶ∗ ൅ ௧ܰିଵܿ଴ଶ∗ ൅ ܲ∗ ൅ ܺ∗ ൌ 0 
Proposition 11: the real water price should be more than what individuals are 
willing to pay to pollute.  From (a5) and (a7) ሺ1 ൅ ܾ ൅ ߙܾߚ െ ܾߚሻܷ௉ െ ܷ௖೚మെߙܷ௖೚భ ൌ 0. 
ௗ௖೟శభ,బమ
ௗ௉೟శభ ൌ
ሺଵା௕ାఈ௕ఉି௕ఉሻ௎ುು
௨೎೚మ೎೚మ
൐ 0 
The higher the pollution, the higher the water consumption is. If more pollution 
is caused by more production, then individuals have more income and saving to make 
more contribution to the pollution abatement, so that they can also consume more water 
without affecting the sustainability. If more pollution is caused by less abatement, then 
individuals prefer to consume less water when they are young and more when they are 
old. It is easy to reason that higher self-absorption rate of water, more advanced 
technology of abatement, or less altruism makes this effect stronger. The graph in figure 
3 tilts outward.  
݀ܿ଴ଵ
݀ܲ ൌ
ߙሺ1 ൅ ܾ ൅ ߙܾߚ െ ܾߚሻܷ௉௉
ݑ௖೚భ௖೚భ
൐ 0 
When there is more pollution, individuals tend to consume more of the private 
good. If more pollution is caused by more production, then individuals have more income 
to spend on private good consumption. If more pollution is caused by less abatement, 
then individuals have more purchasing power from less spending on the pollution 
abatement, so that they prefer to consume more private good. It is the trade-off between 
private good and water quality. The effect will be reinforced by higher natural absorption 
rate of water. Obviously, if water is more self-cleaned, individuals do not have to spend 
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as much money on the pollution abatement, and therefore, they can spend more on the 
private good consumption. Also, more advanced technology of abatement, or less 
altruism makes the effect stronger. The line in figure 1-3 will tilt outward in the situation. 
 
Figure 1-3 Marginal change of consumption of old to the pollution in period one 
               Proposition 12: When physical water bequest is not applicable, but other 
bequests are, from equation 1.7, consumption from individual and firm are non-zero if 
and only if accumulative pollution is negative. In another words, the pollution decreases 
from last period, or the pollution abatement is more than the new pollution: ߤ ௧ܻାଵ ൏
ߙ ௧ܲ ൅ ܾܼ̅௧ାଵ ൅ ܾݖ௧ାଵ  (from equation 1.8). Therefore, individuals tend to use larger 
proportion of their savings than before to make enough contribution to the pollution 
abatement.  
Proposition 13: When monetary bequest is not applicable, but other bequests are, 
from equation 1.6, wage is the only source of income that is distributed to private good 
consumption and pollution abatement contribution. Marginal disutility of pollution 
increases than that when there is no monetary bequest, since the individuals have to work 
dP
dc0
1
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harder and earn extra income so that pollution control level is not decreasing. If there is 
not more pollution control, individual has to consume less of private goods.    
1.2.2 Social equilibrium  
Extra pollution will cause externality or social cost, so intervention is needed. 
Individual consumers or producers may not take the external costs of production into 
account.  However, a social planner may be interested in internalizing the external costs 
of pollution which is represented by the damage function, ܦ௧ା௝ ( ௧ܲା௝ ), j=0, 1, 2.  
Following Hershaft et al. (1976), the damage function has an “S” shape (Figure 1-4). At 
the beginning the marginal damage is increasing as more pollution, and at the end the 
marginal damage becomes stable and reaches zero.  
In order to simplify the problem, I, here use a concave function as it shows at the 
middle section and the last section of the curve. Formally, ܦሺ ௧ܲሻ ൌ ߢ ௟௡௉೟ି௟௡௉೟
೘೔೙
௟௡௉೟೘ೌೣ . Where 
ߢ can be greater, less than or even equal to 1, since for such pollutant as nuclear waste, 
ߢ ൒ 1; for some minor pollution, ߢ ൏ 1. The damage function represents the relationship 
between damage and pollution from same period. 
For the social planner, the problem is maximize the present value of utility net of 
the external cost of pollution: 
௧ܸ ൌ ݉ܽݔ					 ∑ ߚ௧ሾାஶ௧ୀ଴ ܷ൫ܿ௧,௬ଵ , ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ , ܿ௧,௬ଶ , ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଶ , ௧ܲାଵ൯ െ 	ܦሺ ௧ܲାଵሻሿ									  (1.14) 
Subject to 
௧ܹାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ߱ሻ ௧ܹ െ ௧ܰܿ௧,௬ଶ െ ௧ܰିଵܿ௧,଴ଶ െ ௧ܲ െ ܺ௧       (1.15) 
௧ܲାଵ ൌ μ݂ܰሺ݇௧ାଵሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ௧ܲ െ ܾܰݖ௧ାଵ        (1.16)  
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 ݂ሺ݇௧ሻ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଵ ൅ ܿ௧,௬ଵ ൅ ௖೟,బ
భ
ଵା௡ ൅ ܾݖ௧ାଵ       (1.17) 
ݖ௧ାଵ ൒ 0, ௧ܹାଵ ൒ 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-4 Environmental damage curve 
Social planner considers the same altruistic degree, 	ߚ , and the same utility 
function, U, as individuals do.  Solution for the social planner’s problem is shown in the 
Appendix B. From equation (b1 and a2), we obtain  
௨೎೟,೤భ
௨೎೟శభ,೚భ
ൌ ௖೟శభ,೚భఋ௖೟,೤భ ൌ
ሺଵା௡ሻద೟శభ
ఉద೟శమ     
Note that MRS of private good consumption between two periods is different 
from that of the individual’s problem, as seen in equation (a1, a2). However, note that 
࢛ࢉ࢚,࢟૛
࢛ࢉ࢚శ૚,࢕૛
ൌ ࢉ࢚శ૚,࢕૛ࢾࢉ࢚,࢟૛ ൌ
࢚ࢗశ૚
ࢼ࢚ࢗశ૛   
That is, MRS of water consumption between two periods is the same as that of 
the individual’s problem; both are equal to the shadow price ratio with discount factor.  
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When water bequest is non-negative, then ߚଶݍ௧ାଶሺ1 ൅ ߱ሻ ൌ ߚݍ௧ାଵ => ௤೟శమ௤೟శభ ൌ
ଵ
ఉሺଵାఠሻ , 
which is the same as that in the individual’s problem. Modified Hoteling’s Rule still holds. 
ௗ௖೟శభ,బమ
ௗ௉೟శభ ൌ
ேሺ௚ುುି஽ುುሻ
௨೎೚మ೎೚మ
൐ 0  
Water consumption when individuals are old is positively related to pollution 
created during their working period. That is, if individuals cause more pollution when 
young, they would have paid a larger amount toward pollution abatement, and thus, will 
have left themselves with more than proportionate amount of water for consumption 
when they are old.  
݀ܿ௧ାଵ,଴ଵ
݀ ௧ܲାଵ ൌ
ܾܰሺ݃௉௉ െ ܦ௉௉ሻ
െݑ௖೚భ௖೚భ
൏ 0 
More pollution makes individuals consume less of private good? when they are 
old, since they have to contribute more of their savings to the pollution abatement so that 
they can keep the water consumption level and sustainability.  
݀ܿ௧ାଶ,௢ଵ
݀ ௧ܲାଵ ൌ
ܾܰሺ݃௉௉ െ ܦ௉௉ሻ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻܷ௖೚భ௖೚భ
൐ 0 
However, more pollution will make the private good consumption more 
affordable for their offspring, since the more pollution means the more production and in 
turn, more income.  With higher income, the current generation will have the ability to 
provide for more monetary bequest for its offspring, which results into higher 
consumption of private goods by the latter.   
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1.3. Policy and management implications  
                As we saw in the previous sections, individuals’ behavior is different from 
social planner’s decision. When pollution increases, private good consumption decreases 
in social planner’s problem but increases in the individual’s problem. An increase in 
interest rate might fix this discrepancy. To make sure the water consumption level does 
not decrease, government may subsidize water pollution abatement.  Since the firm 
causes most pollution, government may impose a lump-sum tax/fine on firms as well. 
The final effect of taxes and subsidies on pollution would be the same.   
Policies can be designed to promote the three types of bequests as introduced 
before: monetary bequest, physical water bequest and water quality bequest (the 
individuals’ contributions to water pollution abatement), without hurting the social 
welfare. One of the major concerns is the physical water bequest, which is governed by 
the two coupled, dynamic constraints of available water and pollution, ௧ܹାଵ ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ ߱ሻ ௧ܹ െ ௧ܰܿ௧,௬ଶ െ ௧ܰିଵܿ௧,଴ଶ െ ௧ܲ െ ܺ௧  and ௧ܲାଵ ൌ μ݂ܰሺ݇௧ାଵሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ௧ܲ െ
ܾܰݖ௧ାଵ. Any changes on the right hand side of the first constraint affects how much 
water is left for the next generation.  However, the current physical water level is not 
controllable, and the other four terms are. There are three instruments that could be 
applied by the government. First, raising interest rate can influence the behavior of 
altruists.  With higher interest rate applied to the individuals’ following budget constraint, 
 ݉௧ାଵ′ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ௛ ൫ݓ௧ ൅ ݉௧ െ ܿ௧,௬ଵ ′൯ െ ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ ′ െ ݖ௧ାଵ′ 
Individuals tend to consume fewer amounts of private goods when they are young.  They 
will save more money towards the second period, i.e., when they are old. More monetary 
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contribution to pollution abatement also will occur because of more savings from the first 
period. Those savings could be used as more monetary bequest or water quality bequest.  
First, if the extra savings from raising the interest rate is only used to monetary 
bequest, then ݖ௧ାଵᇱ ൌ ݖ௧ାଵ , and ݉௧ାଵᇱ െ ݉௧ାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ௛ ൫ݓ௧ ൅ ݉௧ െ ܿ௧,௬ଵ ′൯ െ ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ ᇱ െ
ܴ௧ାଵ௅ ൫ݓ௧ ൅ ݉௧ െ ܿ௧,௬ଵ ൯ ൅ ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ , where ܴ௧ାଵ௛  and ܴ௧ାଵ௅  are highly and low interest rates, 
respectively. The increment of interest rate should guarantee that the decrease of social 
welfare from reducing the consumption of good 1 when individuals are young at least 
equals the increase of social welfare from the rise of the consumption of good 1 when 
individuals are old. The change in the interest rate would not have any influence on the 
current generation’s behavior of water consumption; nevertheless, it would affect their 
offspring since the next generation will face higher budget constraint. 
Secondly, if the extra savings from raising the interest rate is only used for 
monetary bequest, then ݉௧ାଵᇱ ൌ ݉௧ାଵ , and ݖ௧ାଵᇱ െ ݖ௧ାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ௛ ൫ݓ௧ ൅ ݉௧ െ ܿ௧,௬ଵ ′൯ െ
ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ ᇱ െ ܴ௧ାଵ௅ ൫ݓ௧ ൅ ݉௧ െ ܿ௧,௬ଵ ൯ ൅ ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ . The incremental contribution to pollution 
abatement results in more physical water bequest. And social welfare increases as less 
environmental damage occurs. 
The other policy is to extend subsidies to individuals encouraging them to 
contribute more to the pollution abatement. By denoting subsidy as ݏݑܾ , the budget 
constraint becomes  
݉௧ାଵ ൅ ݏݑܾ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ௅ ൫ݓ௧ ൅ ݉௧ െ ܿ௧,௬ଵ ൯ െ ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ െ ݖ௧ାଵ′  
and ݏݑܾ ൌ ݖ௧ାଵ െ ݖ௧ାଵ′ 
At the same time, the firm’s profit becomes: (pen=penalty) 
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ߨ௧ ൌ ௧ܻ െ ݎ௧ܭ௧ െ ݓ௧ܮ௧ െ ݌݁݊ 
 Lump sum punishment, i.e., tax to the firm’s pollution, is exogenous and like 
the Ricardian Equilibrium, optimal consumption levels of both goods in two periods and 
pollution level will stay the same. Moreover, the tax imposed to the firm could be used to 
subsidize the individual’s consumption of private good or water, so that there will be no 
financial burden to the government for managing such water issue. Therefore, this policy 
would result in more pollution abatement from individuals and less pollution from the 
industry so that it guarantees the availability of physical water for the next generation. 
Another way to change individual’s behavior of water consumption is to set a 
higher real water price, which is more than what individuals are willing to pay for 
pollution. In this case, water price should be set at the shadow price of physical water 
bequest in social planner’s problem, ݍ, which is the marginal utility of water consumption. 
Therefore, the individual’s and firm’s water consumption could be reduced. Even though 
the total water consumption might not decrease as the population grows over time, yet 
this way could keep the total amount of water bequest not drop for less industrial 
consumption. 
1.4. Conclusion 
Freshwater as a special good that is demanded by households, firms and farms.  It 
is a source of satisfaction to households, a factor of production for firms and farms, and a 
sink that absorbs all kinds of waste from human beings.  Economic literature is replete 
with studies that recognize that individuals do express altruism for saving wealth and 
income for future generations.  Very few studies have looked at altruism in the context of 
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environmental resources and sustainability. I introduce parental altruism and 
sustainability in water management. If we care about our next generation, we would 
carefully choose the consumption level and control the pollution level of freshwater, and 
leave certain amount to them. The paper follows Jouvat, et al. (2000), and introduces 
parental altruism via three forms of bequest for managing the water resource. By solving 
individual’s and social planner’s problems, the study shows that the two problems are 
partially consistent with each other. 
The study analyzes how individuals treat the trade offs of three types of bequest: 
monetary bequest, physical water bequest and water quality bequest (the contribution to 
abating water pollution). I find that altruistic degree, population growth rate, water 
natural assimilation rate affect those results. Based on the analysis on individual’s 
problem and social planner’s problem, it is evident that government instruments can be 
applied to promote economically and environmentally sustainable altruism. For instance, 
an increase in the interest rate, subsidies to water pollution abatement, or a lump-sum 
tax/fine to the firm could influence individuals’ altruistic behavior.  Those policy 
instruments are exogenous and will not reduce social welfare. 
My model is applicable to other scarce natural and environmental resources like 
mines, and helpful for the policy maker to reinforce the environment sustainability. 
Further work on empirical testing of the model can be done by using some local data in 
order to design accurate policies specific to individual situations. Also, the model can be 
further improved by imposing the strong sustainability conditions that the amount of 
physical capital of natural resources will not decrease over time.  Such a model would 
call for more stringent management and policy choices in the current period.	
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APPENDIX A 
Langrage equation is set up as the following based on from equation 1.4 to equation 1.13 
ܮ ൌ෍ߚ௦ି௧ܷ൫ܿ௦,௬ଵ , ܿ௦ାଵ,௢ଵ , ܿ௦,௬ଶ , ܿ௦ାଵ,௢ଶ , ௦ܲାଵ൯
ஶ
௦ୀ௧
൅෍ߚ
௦ି௧ାଵߠ௦ାଵ
1 ൅ ݊ ሾܴ௦ାଵ൫ݓ௦ ൅ ݉௦ െ ܿ௦,௬
ଵ ൯ െ ܿ௦ାଵ,௢ଵ െ ݖ௦ାଵ	ሿ
ஶ
௦ୀ௧
൅෍ߚ௦ି௧ାଵߩ௦ାଵሼሺ1 ൅ ωሻ ୱܹ െ ሾܿ௧,௬ଶ ൅ ሺN୲ െ 1ሻܿ௧̅,௬ଶ ሿ െ ሾܿ௧,଴ଶ ൅ ሺN୲ିଵ
ஶ
௦ୀ௧
െ 1ሻܿ௧̅,଴ଶ ሿ െ Pୱ െ ܺ௦	ሽ
൅෍ߚ
௦ି௧ାଵ߭௦ାଵ
ܾ ሾെPୱାଵ ൅ φYୱାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ αሻPୱ ൅ ܼ̅௧ାଵሿ
ஶ
௦ୀ௧
െ෍ߚ௦ି௧ߠ௦݉௦
ஶ
௦ୀ௧
െ෍ߚ௦ି௧ߩ௦ ௦ܹ
ஶ
௦ୀ௧
െ෍ߚ௦ି௧߭௦ݖ௦
ஶ
௦ୀ௧
 
݈݅݉௧→ஶߚ௧ାଵߩ௧ାଵ ቂሺ1 ൅ ωሻ ୲ܹ െ N୲ܿ௧,௬ଶ െ ୒౪ଵା௡ ܿ௧,௢ଶ െ P୲ െ ܺ௧ቃ ൌ 0  
݈݅݉௧→ஶߚ௧ାଵ߭௧ାଵݖ௧ାଵ ൌ 0  
݈݅݉௧→ஶߚ௧ାଵߠ௧ାଵሾܴ௧ାଵሺݓ௧ ൅ ݉௧ሻ െ ܿ௧ାଵଵ െ ݖ௧ାଵሿ ൌ 0  
ߩ is considered as the water scarcity rent, which is the real value/price of water. Langrage 
is set up for there is a sustainability, such condition as below is applied.  
ߩ௧ାଵ ௧ܹାଵ ൒ ߩ௧ ௧ܹ 
Which represent the definition of sustainability. 
 (The control variables of ܿ௧ାଵଵ , ܿ௧,௬ଶ , ܿ௧ାଵ,௬ଶ , ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଶ , P୲ାଵ).  
FOCs: 
డ௅
డ௖೟భ ൌ ܷ௖೟,೤భ െ
ఉோ೟శభ
ଵା௡ ߠ௧ାଵ ൌ 0	         (a1) 
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డ௅
డ௖೟శభభ
ൌ ܷ௖೟శభ,೚భ െ
ఉ
ଵା௡ ߠ௧ାଵ ൌ 0	         (a2) 
డ௅
డ௖೟,೤మ
ൌ ܷ௖೟,೤మ െ ߚߩ௧ାଵ ൌ 0	         (a3)      
డ௅
డ௖೟శభ,೚మ
ൌ ܷ௖೟శభ,೚మ െ ߚଶߩ௧ାଶ ൌ 0        (a4)    
డ௅
డ௉೟శభ ൌ ܷ௉೟శభ െ ߚ
ଶߩ௧ାଶ െ ߚ߭௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ αሻߚଶ߭௧ାଶ ൌ 0      (a5)                    
డ௅
డௐ೟ ൌ ߚߩ௧ାଵሺ1 ൅ ωሻ െ ߩ௧ ൑ 0 (=0 if W>0)       (a6) 
డ௅
డ௭೟శభ ൌ െܾܷ௉೟శభ െ
ఉఏ೟శభ
ଵା௡ െ ߚ߭௧ାଵ ൑ 0 (=0 if z>0)      (a7) 
డ௅
డ௠೟ ൌ
ఉோ೟శభ
ଵା௡ ߠ௧ାଵ െ ߠ௧ ൑ 0 (=0 if m>0)       (a8) 
Combining equations a1 and a2 : ܷ௖೟,೤భ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵܷ௖೟శభ,೚భ  
Combining equations a3 and a4: 
௎೎೟,೤మ
௎೎೟శభ,೚మ
ൌ ఘ೟శభఉఘ೟శమ 
Combining equations a5 and a4: 
ܷ௖೟శభ,೚మ െ ܷ௉೟శభ ൌ ߚ߭௧ାଵ െ ሺ1 െ αሻߚଶ߭௧ାଶ       (a9) 
If pollution abatement contribution is operative, then  
െܾܷ௉೟శభ െ ఉఏ೟శభଵା௡ െ ߚ߭௧ାଵ ൌ 0.  
And  equation (a9) combining (a1) and (a2) becomes  
ܷ௖೟శభ,೚మ െ ሺ1 െ ܾሻܷ௉೟శభ ൅ ܷ௖೟శభ,೚భ െ ሺ1 െ αሻߚሺܾܷ௉೟శమ ൅
ܷ௖೟శభ,೤భ
ܴ௧ାଵ ሻ ൌ 0 
Taking total differentials (by the assumption that ܷ is an additive function of ݑ	and ݒ, the 
cross derivatives are zero): 
݀ܿ௧ାଵ,௬ଵ
݀ ௧ܲାଵ ൌ െ
ሺ1 െ bሻܴ௧ାଶܷ௉௉
ሺ1 െ αሻߚܷ௖೤భ௖೤భ
൏ 0 
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݀ ௧ܲାଵ
݀ܿ௧ାଵ,଴ଶ ൌ
ܷ௖బమ௖೚మ
ሺ1 െ ܾሻܷ௉௉ ൐ 0 
݀ ௧ܲାଵ
݀ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ ൌ
ܷ௖೚భ௖೚భ
ሺ1 െ ܾሻܷ௉௉ ൐ 0 
Combing equations a6, a3 and a4: ሺ1 ൅ ωሻܷ௖೟శభ,೚మ ൑ ܷ௖೟,೤మ  
Combining equations a8, a1 and a2: ܷ௖೟,೤భ െ
ଵା௡
ఉ ܷ௖೟,೚భ ൑ 0 
Denote 
ܷ ൌ ఊሺ௟௡௖೟,೤భ ି௟௡௖೟,೤భ೘೔೙ሻ௟௡௖೟,೤భ೘ೌೣ ൅
ఊఋሺ௟௡௖೟శభ,೚భ ି௟௡௖೟శభ,೚భ೘೔೙ሻ
௟௡௖೟శభ,೚భ೘ೌೣ
൅ ఎሺ௟௡௖೟,೤మ ି௟௡௖೟,೤మ೘೔೙ሻ௟௡௖೟,೤మ೘ೌೣ ൅
ఎఋሺ௟௡௖೟శభ,೚మ ି௟௡௖೟శభ,೚మ೘೔೙ሻ
௟௡௖೟శభ,೚మ೘ೌೣ
െ
ሺ1 െ ߛ െ ߟሻ ௟௡௉೟ି௟௡௉೟೘೔೙௟௡௉೟೘ೌೣ          (a10) 
Assume that ݈݊ܿ௧,௬ଵ௠௔௫ ൌ ݈݊ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ௠௔௫ and ݈݊ܿ௧,௬ଶ௠௔௫ ൌ ݈݊ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଶ௠௔௫, ݂ሺ݇௧ାଵ, ݔ௧ାଵሻ ൌ ܣ݇௧ାଵఌ ݔ௧ାଵఒ  
ܴ௧ାଵ ൌ ܣߝ݇௧ାଵఌିଵݔ௧ାଵఒ           (a11) 
ݓ௧ ൌ ݂ሺ݇௧, ݔ௧ሻ െ ݇௧ ௞݂ െ ݔ௧ ௫݂ ൌ ܣ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ െ 	ܣߝ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ െ ܣߣ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ ൌ ܣሺ1 െ ߝ െ ߣሻ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ  
           (a12) 
Therefore, the optimal levels of capital and water used in industry are as below. 
݇௧ାଵ ൌ ఌ௪೟శభோ೟శభሺଵିఌିఒሻ          (a13) 
ݔ௧ାଵఒ ൌ ଵ஺ ቀ
ଵିఌିఒ
௪೟శభ ቁ
ఌିଵ ቀோ೟శభఌ ቁ
ఌ
        (a14) 
Simplifying equation a1 
 ఊ௖೟,೤భ ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ
ൌ ఉோ೟శభଵା௡ ߠ௧ାଵ ൌ൐ ܿ௧,௬ଵ∗ ൌ
ఊሺଵା௡ሻ
ఉ஺ఌ௞೟శభഄషభ௫೟శభഊ ఏ೟శభ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ
  
It is the demand function of good 1 for the individual when they young. 
Simplifying equation a2 
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 ఊఋ௖೟శభ,೚భ ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ
ൌ ఉଵା௡ ߠ௧ାଵ ൌ൐ ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ∗ ൌ
ఊఋሺଵା௡ሻ
ఉఏ೟శభ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ
=>ߠ௧ାଵ ൌ ఊఋሺଵା௡ሻఉ௖೟శభ,೚భ ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ 
I. when contribution is not operative (z=0, then െbߚߩ௧ାଶ െ ሺ1 ൅ ܾሻ߭௧ାଵ ൅
bሺ1 െ αሻߚ߭௧ାଶ െ ఏ೟శభଵା௡ ൏ 0): 
from (1.6) and combing market clearing condition  ݏ௧ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଵ 
݉௧ାଵ ൌ ܣߝ݇௧ାଵఌ ݔ௧ାଵఒ െ ଵଵା௡
ఊఋሺଵା௡ሻ
ఉఏ೟శభ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ
       (a15) 
݉௧ ൌ ܣߝ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ െ ఊఋఉఏ೟௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ          (a16) 
Plugging into equation 1.5 and update one period forward, 
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଵ ൌ ܣሺ1 െ ߝ െ ߣሻ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ ൅ ܣߝ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ െ ఊఋఉఏ೟௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ െ
ఊሺଵା௡ሻ
ఉ஺ఌ௞೟శభഄషభ௫೟శభഊ ఏ೟శభ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ
             
(a17) 
When monetary bequest is operative, then a8 becomes: 
ఉ஺ఌ௞೟శభഄషభ௫೟శభഊ
ଵା௡ ߠ௧ାଵ ൌ ߠ௧          (a18) 
Multiplying ߠ௧ on the both sides of equation a15,  
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଵߠ௧ ൌ ߠ௧ܣሺ1 െ ߣሻ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ െ ߛߜߚ݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫ െ
ߛሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻߠ௧
ߚܣߝ݇௧ାଵఌିଵݔ௧ାଵఒ ߠ௧ାଵ݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫
 
Define ߠ௧ܣ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ ൌ ߦ௧         (a19) 
Then  
ߚߝߦ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߣሻߦ௧ െ ߛ݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫ ሺ1 ൅
ߜ
ߚሻ 
At the steady state: ߦ௧ାଵ ൌ ߦ௧ 
ሺ1 െ ߚߝ െ ߣሻߦ ൌ ఊ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ ሺ1 ൅
ఋ
ఉሻ=>ߦ ൌ
ఊሺଵାഃഁሻ
ሺଵିఉఌିఒሻ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ
 , 
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Plugging into equations a18 and a19 
ఉఌక
ଵା௡ ൌ ߠ௧ , and ߠ௧ାଵ ൌ
క
஺௞೟శభഄ ௫೟శభഊ
 
Plugging into equation a14, 
݉∗ ൌ ܣ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ ቆߝ െ ߛߜߦߚ݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫ቇ ൌ
ݓ
1 െ ߝ െ ߣ
ۉ
ۈ
ۈ
ۇ
ߝ െ ߛߜ
ߛሺ1 ൅ ߜߚሻ
ሺ1 െ ߚߝ െ ߣሻ݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫ ߚ݈݊ܿ௬
ଵ௠௔௫
ی
ۋ
ۋ
ۊ
ൌ ݓ1 െ ߝ െ ߣ ൬ߝ െ
ߜሺ1 െ ߚߝ െ ߣሻ
ߚ ൅ ߜ ൰ 
As long as ߝ െ ఋሺଵିఉఌିఒሻఉାఋ ൐ 0, monetary bequest ݉∗ is applicable. Therefore, 
ߚ ൐ ߜሺ1 െ ߝ െ ߣሻߝሺ1 ൅ ߜሻ ≡ ߚ 
Therefore, when ߚ ൐ ߚ, monetary bequest is operative, which is ௪ଵିఌିఒ ቀߝ െ
ఋሺଵିఉఌିఒሻ
ఉାఋ ቁ 
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଵ ൌ ܣ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ ൬ߝ െ ߜሺ1 െ ߚߝ െ ߣሻߚ ൅ ߜ ൰ 
൅ܣሺ1 െ ߝ െ ߣሻ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ െ ߛ
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ
ߚܣߝ݇௧ାଵఌିଵݔ௧ାଵఒ ߠ௧ାଵ݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫
ൌ ܣ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ ቆ1 െ ߜ
ሺ1 െ ߚߝ െ ߣሻ
ߚ ൅ ߜ െ ߣቇ െ
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻሺ1 െ ߚߝ െ ߣሻ݇௧ାଵ
ߚߝ ൅ ߝߜ  
݇௧ାଵ ൌ ߝሺߚ ൅ ߜሻሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻሺ1 ൅ ߝߜ െ ߣሻܣ݇௧
ఌݔ௧ఒ ቆߚ
ሺ1 ൅ ߜߝ െ ߣሻ
ߚ ൅ ߜ ቇ ൌ ܣ݇௧
ఌݔ௧ఒ ߝߚሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ 
In the equilibrium, ݇௧ାଵ ൌ ݇௧ 
݇∗ ൌ ൬஺ఌఉ௫೟ഊଵା௡ ൰
భ
భషഄ ൌ ቌఌఉ൬
భషഄషഊ
ೢ೟శభ ൰
ഄషభ
ቀೃ೟శభഄ ቁ
ഄ
ଵା௡ ቍ
భ
భషഄ
ൌ ଵିఌିఒఌ௪ ቀ
ఉ
ଵା௡ቁ
భ
భషഄ ܴ ഄభషഄ  
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And P∗ ൌ ஦஑ Ak∗கx∗஛ from equation 1.8 
P∗ ൌ φα Aߝ
ିக ൬1 െ ߝ െ ߣݓ ൰
கି஛
൬ ߚ1 ൅ ݊൰
க
ଵିఌ ܴ ఌ
಍
ଵିఌ ቆߝ െ ߜሺ1 െ ߚߝ െ ߣሻߚ ൅ ߜ ቇ
஛
 
ߠ௧ାଵ ൌ ߚߝߦ1 ൅ ݊ ൌ
ߚߝ
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ
ߛሺ1 ൅ ߜߚሻ
ሺ1 െ ߚߝ െ ߣሻ݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫ 
From a7: 
߭௧ାଵ ൌ
െܾܷ௉೟శభ
ߚ െ
ߠ௧ାଵ
1 ൅ ݊
ൌ െ ߚߝሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻଶ
ߛ ൬1 ൅ ߜߚ൰
ሺ1 െ ߚߝ െ ߣሻ݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫
൅ ܾሺ1 െ ߛ െ ߟሻ
φߚ
α Aߝିக ቀ
1 െ ߝ െ ߣ
ݓ ቁ
கି஛
൬ ߚ1 ൅ ݊൰
க
ଵିఌ ൬ߝ െ ߜሺ1 െ ߚߝ െ ߣሻߚ ൅ ߜ ൰
஛
݈݊ ௧ܲ௠௔௫
൐ 0 
Therefore, simplifying the equation above,  
ܾ ൐ φߛ
ሺߚ ൅ ߜሻଵି஛Aߝିகାଵ ቀ1 െ ߝ െ ߣݓ ቁ
கି஛
ሺߚሻ ଵଵିக൫ߝߚ ൅ ߝߜ െ ߜሺ1 െ ߚߝ െ ߣሻ൯஛݈݊ ௧ܲ௠௔௫
αሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻଶା கଵିఌሺ1 െ ߛ െ ߟሻሺ1 െ ߚߝ െ ߣሻ݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫
≡ ܾ 
Therefore, this is the constraint for pollution abatement contribution being applicable. 
When ߚ ൑ ߚ, the motive of monetary bequest is too low to take action. 
݉∗ ൌ 0, then from equation 1.5,  
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଵ ൌ ܣሺ1 െ ߝ െ ߣሻ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ െ ఊሺଵା௡ሻఉ஺ఌ௞೟శభഄషభ௫೟శభഊ ఏ೟శభ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ    (a20) 
From 1.6  
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ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଵܣߝ݇௧ାଵఌିଵݔ௧ାଵఒ ൌ ఊఋሺଵା௡ሻఉఏ೟శభ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଵܴ௧ାଵ   
ܣ݇௧ାଵఌିଵݔ௧ାଵఒ ൌ ఊఋఌ௞೟శభఉఏ೟శభ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ or ߠ௧ ൌ
ఊఋ
௞೟ோ೟	ఉ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ
 
Therefore, equation a20 becomes 
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߝ െ ߣሻ ݇௧ܴ௧ߝߛߜ െ
ߝ݇௧ାଵሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ
ߜ  
In the steady state, ݇௧ ൌ ݇௧ାଵ, therefore,  
݇∗ሺ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߝ െ ߣሻ ܴ௧ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻߝߛߜ ൅
ߝ
ߜሻ ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻߝߛߜ
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻߝߛߜ െ ܴ௧ሺ1 െ ߝ െ ߣሻ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻߝଶߛ 
II. When contribution is operative (z>0, then 	ఉఏ೟శభଵା௡ ൅ ߚሺ1 ൅ ܾሻ߭௧ାଵ ൌ
െܾߚଶߩ௧ାଶ ൅ bሺ1 െ αሻߚଶ߭௧ାଶ: 
From (2), combining ݏ௧ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଵ 
݉௧∗ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଵ െ ܣሺ1 െ ߝ െ ߣሻ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ ൅ ఊሺଵା௡ሻఉ஺ఌ௞೟శభഄషభ௫೟శభഊ ఏ೟శభ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ (a.21) 
Therefore, ݉௧ାଵ∗ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଶ െ ܣሺ1 െ ߝ െ ߣሻ݇௧ାଵఌ ݔ௧ାଵఒ ൅ ఊሺଵା௡ሻఉ஺ఌ௞೟శమഄషభ௫೟శమഊ ఏ೟శమ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ 
(3): ݖ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻܣߝ݇௧ାଵఌିଵݔ௧ାଵఒ ݇௧ାଵ െ ఊఋሺଵା௡ሻఉఏ೟శభ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ ൤ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଶ െ
ܣሺ1 െ ߝ െ ߣሻ݇௧ାଵఌ ݔ௧ାଵఒ ൅ ఊሺଵା௡ሻఉ஺ఌ௞೟శమഄషభ௫೟శమഊ ఏ೟శమ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣቃ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻሺ1 െ ߣሻܣ݇௧ାଵ
ఌ ݔ௧ାଵఒ െ
ఊఋሺଵା௡ሻ
ఉఏ೟శభ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ
െ ఊሺଵା௡ሻఉ஺ఌ௞೟శమഄషభ௫೟శమഊ ఏ೟శమ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ
ଶ݇௧ାଶ  (a.22) 
i. When monetary bequest is not operative: 
Now equation (a21) =0, therefore, with define ߠ௧ܣ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ ൌ ߦ௧ 
ݖ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻሺ1 െ ߣሻݓ௧ାଵ1 െ ߝ െ ߣ െ ߜܴ௧ାଵܿ௧,௬
ଵ  
And ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻݏ௧ାଵ െ ݓ௧ ൅ ܿ௧,௬ଵ ൌ 0 
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Therefore, ݖ∗ ൌ ሺଵା௡ሻሺଵିఒሻ௪ଵିఌିఒ ൅ ߜܴ ቂሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ
ఌ௪
ோሺଵିఌିఒሻ െ ݓቃ ൌ
ሺଵା௡ሻሺଵିఒାఋఌሻ௪ିఋோ௪ሺଵିఌିఒሻ
ଵିఌିఒ  
݇∗ ൌ ߝݓܴሺ1 െ ߝ െ ߣሻ 
 
ii. When monetary bequest is operative, then a8: 
ߚܣߝ݇௧ఌିଵݔ௧ఒ
1 ൅ ݊ ߠ௧ାଵ ൌ ߠ௧ ൌ
ߚߝߦ௧ାଵ
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଵ 
Assume ܿ଴,௬ଵ  is givien, thenߠଵ ൌ ఊఋሺଵା௡ሻఉ௖భ,೚భ ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ, and then ߠ௧ ൌ ሺ
ଵା௡
ఉ஺ఌ௞೟ഄషభ௫೟ഊ
ሻ௧  
Equation (a22) becomes: 
ߠ௧ାଵݖ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻߠ௧ାଵܣ݇௧ାଵఌ ݔ௧ାଵఒ െ ߛߜ
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ
ߚ݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫ െ
ߠ௧ାଵߛሺ૚ ൅ ࢔ሻଶ
ߚܣߝ݇௧ାଵఌିଵݔ௧ାଵఒ ߠ௧ାଶ݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫
൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻଶ݇௧ାଶߠ௧ାଵ
ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻߠ௧ାଵܣ݇௧ାଵఌ ݔ௧ାଵఒ െ ߛߜ
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻሺ1 ൅ ߚሻ
ߚ݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫
൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻߠ௧ାଶߚܣߝ݇௧ାଶఌ ݔ௧ାଶఒ  
With ߠ௧ܣ݇௧ఌݔ௧ఒ ൌ ߦ௧, 
 ఉఌక೟శమሺଵା௡ሻ௞೟శమ ݖ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺߦ௧ାଵ ൅ ߚߝߦ௧ାଶሻሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ െ
ఊఋሺଵା௡ሻሺଵାఉሻ
ఉ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ
 
ݖ௧ାଵ ൌ ቈሺߦ௧ାଵ ൅ ߚߨߦ௧ାଶሻሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ െ ߛߜሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻሺ1 ൅ ߚሻߚ݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫ ቉
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଶ
ߚߨߦ௧ାଶ ൐ 0 
Therefore, ሺߦ௧ାଵ ൅ ߚߝߦ௧ାଶሻ െ ఊఋሺଵାఉሻఉ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ ൐ 0 
At the steady state: ߦ௧ାଵ ൌ ߦ௧ାଶ 
Hence, ߦሺ1 ൅ ߚߝሻ ൐ ఊఋሺଵାఉሻఉ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ=>	ߦሺ1 ൅ ߚߝሻ ൐
ఊఋሺଵାఉሻ
ఉ௟௡௖೤భ೘ೌೣ
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Plugging in  
ߚߝߦ௧ାଵ
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଵ ݉௧ ൌ ߚߝߦ௧ାଵ െ ሺ1 െ ߝሻߦ௧ ൅
ߛߦ௧ାଵ
݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫ ൐ 0 
ߚߝ െ ሺ1 െ ߝሻ ൅ ߛ݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫ ൐ 0 ൌ൐ ߚ ൐
ሺ1 െ ߝሻ
ߝ െ
ߛ
ߝ݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫ ≡ ߚ 
Wquation a3 is expressed as  
ఎ
௖೟,೤మ ௟௡௖೟,೤మ೘ೌೣ ൌ ߚߩ௧ାଵ ൌ൐ ܿ௧,௬
ଶ ൌ ఎఉఘ೟శభ௟௡௖మ೘ೌೣ=>ߩଵ ൌ
ఎ
ఉ௖బ,೤మ ௟௡௖೟,೤మ೘ೌೣ 
Equation a4 is expressed as 
 ఎఋ௖೟శభ,೚మ ௟௡௖೟శభ,೚మ೘ೌೣ ൌ ߚ
ଶߩ௧ାଶ ൌ൐ ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଶ ൌ ఎఉమఘ೟శమ௟௡௖మ೘ೌೣ 
When the water bequest is operative, a6:  
ߚߩ௧ାଵሺ1 ൅ ωሻ ൌ ߩ௧ 
Therefore, ߩ௧ ൌ ఎఉ௖బ,೤మ ௟௡௖೟,೤మ೘ೌೣ ቂ
ଵ
ఉሺଵାனሻቃ
௧ିଵ
 
When contribution to abatement is operative: a7 becomes:  
ߚߠ௧ାଵ
1 ൅ ݊ ൌ ܾߚ߭௧ାଵሾ ௧ܰሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ െ 1ሿ െ ߚ߭௧ାଵ 
ఏ೟శభ
ଵା௡ ൌ ߭௧ାଵሾܾ ௧ܰሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ െ ܾ െ 1ሿ => ߭௧ାଵ ൌ
ఉగక೟శభ
ሾ௕ே೟ሺଵା௡ሻି௕ିଵሿሺଵା௡ሻమ௞೟శభ ൌ൐ ߭௧ାଶ ൌ
ఉగక೟శమ
ሾ௕ே೟శభሺଵା௡ሻି௕ିଵሿሺଵା௡ሻమ௞೟శమ 
Equation a5 is express as  
െ ሺଵିఊିఎሻ௉೟௟௡௉೟೘ೌೣ ൌ ߚ
ଶߩ௧ାଶ ൅ ߚ߭௧ାଵ െ ሺ1 െ αሻߚଶ߭௧ାଶ=> 
௧ܲ ൌ െ
ሺ1 െ ߛ െ ߟሻ
ሾߚଶ ߟߚܿ଴,௬ଶ ݈݊ܿ௧,௬ଶ௠௔௫ ൤
1
ߚሺ1 ൅ ωሻ൨
௧ାଵ
൅ ߚߠ௧ାଵ െ ሺ1 െ αሻߚଶߠ௧ାଶሾܾ ௧ܰሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ െ ܾ െ 1ሿሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻሿ݈݊ ௧ܲ
௠௔௫
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௧ܲାଵ ൌ െሺ1 െ ߛ െ ߟሻ
ሾߚଶ ߟߚܿ଴,௬ଶ ݈݊ܿ௧,௬ଶ௠௔௫ ൤
1
ߚሺ1 ൅ ωሻ൨
௧ାଶ
൅ ߚߠ௧ାଶ െ ሺ1 െ αሻߚଶߠ௧ାଷሾܾ ௧ܰሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ െ ܾ െ 1ሿሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻሿ݈݊ ௧ܲ
௠௔௫
 
From equation (5) and combing (a9) 
 
െሺ1 െ ߛ െ ߟሻ
ሾߚ ߟߚܿ଴,௬ଶ ݈݊ܿ௧,௬ଶ௠௔௫ ൤
1
ߚሺ1 ൅ ωሻ൨
௧ାଶ
൅
ߚߨߦ௧ାଷሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଷ െ ሺ1 െ αሻߚ
ߚߨߦ௧ାସሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାସሾܾ ௧ܰሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ െ ܾ െ 1ሿሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ ሿ݈݊ ௧ܲ
௠௔௫
ൌ ߚφܣ݇௧ାଵఌ ݔ௧ାଵఒ
െ ሺ1
െ αሻ ሺ1 െ ߛ െ ߟሻ
ሾߚ ߟߚܿ଴,௬ଶ ݈݊ܿ௧,௬ଶ௠௔௫ ൤
1
ߚሺ1 ൅ ωሻ൨
௧ାଵ
൅
ߚߨߦ௧ାଶሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଶ െ ሺ1 െ αሻߚ
ߚߨߦ௧ାଷሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଷሾܾ ௧ܰሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ െ ܾ െ 1ሿሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ ሿ݈݊ ௧ܲ
௠௔௫
െ ߚܾ ௧ܰ ቈሺߦ௧ାଵ ൅ ߚߨߦ௧ାଶሻሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ െ ߛߜሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻሺ1 ൅ ߚሻ݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫ ቉ 
 
െሺ1 െ ߛ െ ߟሻ ߚߨߦ௧ାଶሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଶ
ሾߚ ߟߚܿ଴,௬ଶ ݈݊ܿ௧,௬ଶ௠௔௫ ൤
1
ߚሺ1 ൅ ωሻ൨
௧ାଶ
൅
ߚߨߦ௧ାଷሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଷ െ ሺ1 െ αሻߚ
ߚߨߦ௧ାସሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାସሾܾ ௧ܰሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ െ ܾ െ 1ሿሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ ሿ݈݊ ௧ܲ
௠௔௫
ൌ ߚφߦ௧ାଵ െ ሺ1 െ αሻ 
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ሺ1 െ ߛ െ ߟሻ ߚߨߦ௧ାଶሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଶ
ሾߚ ߟߚܿ଴,௬ଶ ݈݊ܿ௧,௬ଶ௠௔௫ ൤
1
ߚሺ1 ൅ ωሻ൨
௧ାଵ
൅
ߚߨߦ௧ାଶሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଶ െ ሺ1 െ αሻߚ
ߚߨߦ௧ାଷሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଷሾܾ ௧ܰሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ െ ܾ െ 1ሿሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ ሿ݈݊ ௧ܲ
௠௔௫
െ ߚܾ ௧ܰ ൦ሺߦ௧ାଵ ൅ ߚߨߦ௧ାଶሻሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ െ
ߚߨߦ௧ାଶሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ݇௧ାଶ ߛߜሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻሺ1 ൅ ߚሻ
݈݊ܿ௬ଵ௠௔௫ ൪ 
In steady state, ߦ௧ାଵ ൌ ߦ௧ାଶ ൌ ߦ௧ାଷ ൌ ߦ௧ାସ 
Equation (4) becomes: 
୲ܹାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ωሻ ୲ܹ െ N୲ ఎആ
೎బ,೤మ ೗೙೎೟,೤మ೘ೌೣ
ቂ భഁሺభశಡሻቃ
೟௟௡௖మ೘ೌೣ
െ N୲ ఎሺଵା௡ሻ ആഁ೎బ,೤మ ೗೙೎೟,೤మ೘ೌೣቂ
భ
ഁሺభశಡሻቃ
೟శభ௟௡௖మ೘ೌೣ
൅
ିሺଵିఊିఎሻ
ሾఉమ ആഁ೎బ,೤మ ೗೙೎೟,೤మ೘ೌೣቂ
భ
ഁሺభశಡሻቃ
೟శభାഁഇ೟శభషሺభషಉሻഁమഇ೟శమሾ್ಿ೟ሺభశ೙ሻష್షభሿሺభశ೙ሻሿ௟௡௉೟
೘ೌೣ െ N୲ ቀ
௪೟భషഄோ೟ഄ
஺ఌഄሺଵିఌିఒሻభషഄቁ
ଵ/ఒ
 
Equations a5 and a7 are combined as :  
ሺ1 ൅ ܾ ൅ αܾߚ െ ܾߚሻܷ௉ െ ܷ௖೚మെαܷ௖೚భ ൌ 0 
ௗ௖೟శభ,బమ
ௗ௉೟శభ ൌ
ሺଵା௕ା஑௕ఉି௕ఉሻ௎ುು
௨೎೚మ೎೚మ
൐ 0  
Since 1 ൅ ܾ ൅ αܾߚ െ ܾߚ ൐ 0, ݑ௖೚మ௖೚మ ൏ 0 and ݑ௖೚మ௖೚మ ൏ 0, then 
݀ܿ଴ଵ
݀ܲ ൌ
αሺ1 ൅ ܾ ൅ αܾߚ െ ܾߚሻܷ௉௉
ݑ௖೚భ௖೚భ
൐ 0 
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APPENDIX B 
Social Equilibrium 
ܮ ൌ ෍ ߚ௧ሾ
ାஶ
௧ୀିଵ
ܷ൫ܿ௧,௬ଵ , ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ , ܿ௧,௬ଶ , ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଶ , ௧ܲାଵ൯ െ 	ܦሺP୲ାଵሻሿ െ෍ߚ௧ݍ௧ሾ
ାஶ
௧ୀ଴
୲ܹାଵ െ ሺ1 ൅ ωሻ ୲ܹ
൅ N୲ܿ௧,௬ଶ ൅ N୲ିଵܿ௧,଴ଶ ൅ P୲ ൅ ܺ௧ሿ
൅෍ߚ௧߸௧ሾP୲ାଵ െ μNfሺk୲ାଵሻ െ ሺ1 െ αሻP୲ ൅ ܾܰݖ௧ାଵሿ
ାஶ
௧ୀ଴
൅෍ߚ௧߷௧ሾ
ାஶ
௧ୀ଴
fሺk୲ାଵሻ
െ ሺ1 ൅ nሻk୲ାଶ െ c୲ାଵ,୷ଵ െ c୲ାଵ,୭ଵ െ ݖ௧ାଵሿ ൅෍ߚ௧߶௧ݖ௧ାଵ ൅
ାஶ
௧ୀ଴
෍ߚ௧߰௧ ௧ܹାଵ
ାஶ
௧ୀ଴
 
ܷሺܿ, ܲሻ െ ܦሺܲሻ
ൌ ߛሺ݈݊ܿ௧,௬
ଵ െ ݈݊ܿ௧,௬ଵ௠௜௡ሻ
݈݊ܿ௧,௬ଵ௠௔௫ ൅
ߛߜሺ݈݊ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ െ ݈݊ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ௠௜௡ሻ
݈݊ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଵ௠௔௫ ൅
ߟሺ݈݊ܿ௧,௬ଶ െ ݈݊ܿ௧,௬ଶ௠௜௡ሻ
݈݊ܿ௧,௬ଶ௠௔௫
൅ ߟߜሺ݈݊ܿ௧ାଵ,௢
ଶ െ ݈݊ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଶ௠௜௡ሻ
݈݊ܿ௧ାଵ,௢ଶ௠௔௫ െ ሺ1 െ ߛ െ ߟ െ ߢሻ
݈݊ ௧ܲ െ ݈݊ ௧ܲ௠௜௡
݈݊ ௧ܲ௠௔௫  
F.O.C.s: 
డ௅
డ௖೟భ
ൌ ܷ௖೟,೤భ െ ߷௧ ൌ 0 ൌ
ఊ
௖೟,೤భ ௟௡௖భ೘ೌೣ
െ ߷௧        (b1) 
డ௅
డ௖೟శభభ
ൌ ܷ௖೟శభ,೚భ െ ߚ߷௧ାଵ ൌ
ఊఋ
௖೟శభ,೚భ ௟௡௖భ೘ೌೣ
െ ߚ߷௧ାଵ ൌ 0     (b2) 
డ௅
డ௖೟,೤మ ൌ ܷ௖೟,೤మ െ ߚݍ௧ାଵN୲ ൌ
ఎ
௖೟,೤మ ௟௡௖భ೘ೌೣ െ ߚݍ௧ାଵN୲ ൌ 0     (b3)     
డ௅
డ௖೟శభ,೚మ ൌ ܷ௖೟శభ,೚మ െ ߚ
ଶݍ௧ାଶN୲ ൌ ఎఋ௖೟శభ,೚మ ௟௡௖మ೘ೌೣ െ ߚ
ଶݍ௧ାଶN୲ ൌ 0    (b4)   
డ௅
డ௉೟శభ ൌ ܷ௉೟శభ െ D୔౪శభ െ ߚ
ଶݍ௧ାଶ ൅ ߚ߸௧ାଵ െ ሺ1 െ αሻߚଶ߸௧ାଶ ൌ െሺ1 െ ߛ െ ߟ െ
ߢሻ ଵ௉೟శభ௟௡௉೘ೌೣ െ ߚ
ଶݍ௧ାଶ ൅ ߚ߸௧ାଵ െ ሺ1 െ αሻߚଶ߸௧ାଶ ൌ 0     (b5)                    
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డ௅
డௐ೟శభ ൌ ߚ
ଶݍ௧ାଶሺ1 ൅ ωሻ െ ߚݍ௧ାଵ ൅ ߚ߰௧ାଵ ൌ 0       (b6) 
డ௅
డ௭೟శభ ൌ ߚܾ ௧ܰାଵ߸௧ାଵ െ ߚ߷௧ାଵ ൅ ߚ߶௧ାଵ ൌ 0	         (b7) 
డ௅
డ௞೟శభ ൌ ߚ߷௧ାଵf
ᇱሺ݇௧ାଵሻ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ߷௧ െ ߚ߸௧ାଵμN୲ାଵf ᇱሺk୲ାଵሻ ൌ 0     (b8) 
Define ܷሺܿ, ܲሻ െ ܦሺܲሻ ൌ ݑሺܿሻ ൅ ݃ሺܲሻ െ ܦሺܲሻ 
Solutions are as the following: 
Equations b1 and b2=>
௎೎೟,೤భ
௎೎೟శభ,೚భ
ൌ ௖೟శభ,೚భఋ௖೟,೤భ ൌ
ሺଵା௡ሻద೟
ఉద೟శభ    MRS of private good 
consumption between two period is different from that of the individual’s problem. 
Equations b3 and b4 =>
௎೎೟,೤మ
௎೎೟శభ,೚మ
ൌ ௖೟శభ,೚మఋ௖೟,೤మ ൌ
௤೟శభ
ఉ௤೟శమ   MRS of water consumption 
between two period are the same as that of the individual’s problem, both are equal to the 
shadow price ratio with discount factor.  
Equation b6=> when water bequest is non-negative, then ߚଶݍ௧ାଶሺ1 ൅ ωሻ ൌ
ߚݍ௧ାଵ=> ௤೟శమ௤೟శభ ൌ
ଵ
ఉሺଵାனሻ, which is the same as that in the individual’s problem. 
Equation b7=> ߸௧ାଵ ൌ ଵ௕ே೟శభ ߷௧ାଵ when contribution is non-negative.  
Equations b7 and b8=> ሺߚ߷௧ାଵെ ఉద೟శభஜୠ ሻf ᇱሺ݇௧ାଵሻ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ߷௧ 
݂ᇱሺ݇௧ାଵሻ ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ߷௧߷௧ାଵ
ሺ1െμb
ᇱሻ
ൌ
ߚ ܿ௧ାଵ,௢
ଵ
ߜܿ௧,௬ଵ
ሺ1െμb
ᇱሻ
 
Equations b5 and b7=> ݃௉ െ D୔ ൌ
௨೎೟శభ,೚మ
ே೟ െ
௨೎೟శభ,೚భ
௕ே೟ ൅
ሺଵି஑ሻ௨೎೟శమ,೚భ
௕ே೟  
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ௗ௖೟శభ,బమ
ௗ௉೟శభ ൌ
ேሺ௚ುುିୈౌౌሻ
௨೎೚మ೎೚మ
൐ 0  
݀ ௧ܲାଵ
݀ܿ௧ାଵ,଴ଵ ൌ
െݑ௖೚భ௖೚భ
ܾܰሺ݃௉௉ െ ܦ௉௉ሻ ൏ 0 
݀ܿ௧ାଶ,௢ଵ
݀ ௧ܲାଵ ൌ
ܾܰሺ݃௉௉ െ ܦ௉௉ሻ
ሺ1 െ αሻܷ௖೚భ௖೚భ
൐ 0 
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CHAPTER 2                                                                                     
INTERCONNECTED GAME IN WATER SHARING BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES 
UNDER EXTREME WEATHER SCENARIOS 
2.1.Introduction 
                Allocation of water in the case of trans-boundary rivers often involves 
contested claims and difficult management choices.  According to UN Water’s statistics, 
there are 276 trans-boundary river basins in the world: 64 in Africa, 60 in Asia, 68 in 
Europe, 46 in North America and 38 in South America (UN World Water Development 
Report 4, 2012).  Over 90 percent of them are shared by two or more countries, with a 
maximum of 18 countries in the case of Danube river basin.  As countries share trans-
boundary rivers, especially when at least one party loses her benefit, tensions rise. How 
to allocate water efficiently and fairly between countries becomes prominent.  
In many cases, the parties may reach sharing agreement but fail to enforce the 
same.  This paper concerns water allocation when two countries have to share a river or 
other common water body with non-enforceable or weak water rights (Abbink, et al, 
2005; Adams, et al, 1996).  When water rights do not exist, traditional contracts or 
agreements are difficult to reinforce since arbitration is complex to implement. For 
instance, on April 22, 2010, China announced that it would be building the Zangmu Dam 
across the Brahmaputra river (The Economic Times. 2010), but assured India that the 
project would not have any significant effect on the downstream flow to India (The 
Indian Express, 2010).  However, India, being in a geographically weaker position to 
bargain, still expects China not to have any incentives to deviate.  Some studies on 
international resource sharing game have suggested a side payment (e.g., from India to 
China) to maintain self-enforceable agreement.   
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                Many river sharing agreement are in the core (the set of feasible allocations that 
cannot be improved upon by a subset/a coalition of the players) and side payment by 
downstream country to the upstream country is the major solution to the water sharing 
problem in an agreement. One type of water sharing agreement is so-called downstream 
incremental introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002). It assigns to any country its 
marginal contribution to the set of predecessors in the river. Doing so, it maximizes 
lexicographically the welfare of the most downstream countries in the river in the set of 
core river sharing agreements. It thus favors downstream countries against upstream 
countries.  
This kind of agreement seems to work quite well under normal situation. However, 
a NASA observation found that humans are using more water than rains can replenish, 
and area groundwater levels declined by an average of one foot (30 centimeters) per year 
between 2002 and 2008 (www.nasa.org). In addition, with global warming, Palmer et al. 
(2008) predict that 190 out of 292 rivers will face droughts in 2060, and the majority of 
the rivers they simulated may face reduction in water flows. Ambec and Dinar (2009) 
proved that with the climate change, specifically dry season, the downstream incremental 
scheme does not work properly since the upstream country has incentive to deviate. 
Therefore, upstream incremental fixed water sharing agreement (FWSA) is introduced in 
their work and it is proven that this scheme is stable under the scenario of dry season.  
  Past studies such as Ambec and Dinar (2009) address water-sharing agreement 
when there is a drought. However, warming climate results in extreme weather events 
such as flood as well as drought. In my study, different extreme weather situations is 
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applied into both upstream and downstream incremental scheme, and some results 
conflict with what Ambec and Dinar have found.  
 Further, only side payment or victim payment in an agreement is not politically 
appealing for the victim country (India), which risks a reputation of being a weak 
negotiator (Just and Netanyahu, 2004).  Using interconnected game introduced by Folmer 
1993 to solve such environmental issues become popular. My study will investigate what 
types, more precisely, combination of economic or politically strategies that India will 
have to exercise in order to force China to share water without side payments. Most 
studies in the past [e.g., Hauer and Runge (2007)] consider that the payoffs of each 
country when there is no trade for both countries are zero. I argue that this is not the case 
since when taking consumer’s surplus and the amount of net export into account. Hauer 
and Runge (2007) shed a light on how to calculate the probabilities of mixed strategy 
preferences, yet their study misses 4 strategy sets for both countries. In order to 
understand different strategy options that India will have in order to avoid side payment 
and have access to river water in perpetuity, I introduce two independent games.  The first 
game is the water sharing game (Bennet, at el, 1998) whereby India chooses whether to 
make side payment to China to gain access to water and China will react accordingly.  
The second game is a game of iron ore trade. India decides whether to export iron ore to 
China due to its high demand, and therefore, former could use this game to threaten latter 
to share water. I will then link these two games with the combined strategy sets.  China’s 
combined strategy set is to Share and Import; India’s combined strategy set is to make 
side payment and Export.  It is hypothesized that when the two countries could repeatedly 
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play mix strategies with certain probability, interconnected game works perfectly. On the 
one hand, China would share the river water with India without a side payment in return, 
which is desired by the international community; on the other hand, India will not export 
the ore to China, an outcome that depends on the relative values of marginal benefit and 
marginal cost of import 
While Just et al. (2004) developed an interconnected game between two 
countries, to the best of my knowledge, no studies have investigated the extreme situation 
of wet/flooding season. The theoretical results from this study are expected to shed light 
on how the two countries may negotiate an appropriate river sharing agreement, 
including flood management agreement in the future.   
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, the model of 
interconnected game is presented under two extreme weather scenarios: drought and 
flood, and some results are generated from the analysis from section II. Conclusion will 
be drawn in the third section. 
2.2. Model 
Before applying interconnected game to solve water-sharing issue by linking 
with some other non-water issue, it is vital to design reasonable and stable independent 
games.  
2.2.1 Independent Games 
2.2.1.1Water Sharing Game 
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I would like to start with the water sharing game by testing the downstream 
incremental and upstream incremental agreement by Ambec, et al (2010). Take China 
(the upstream country) and India (the downstream country) as an example. The two 
countries share the river called Brahmaputra. China plans to dam the river. China assured 
India at the 2013 BRICS summit that the proposed dams would be run-of-the-river 
hydroelectric projects and that it would neither store water nor adversely affect its 
downstream flow to India.   India expects China to share the water during drought season 
and desires less water or expects China to conduct some flood control during wet/flood 
season. So far there is no water sharing agreement for this river between those two 
countries, therefore, it is urgent and substantial to construct a mechanism so that no party 
will lose water-related benefits.  
Suppose that China controls ݁ଵ  units of water and India controls ݁ଶ  units of 
water. Water consumption gives each country different benefits.  That is, the downstream, 
water-scarce country benefits more from a given level of water consumption than the 
upstream, water-rich country.  Different uses of water also give different benefits: water 
intensive industry, like agriculture, derives more benefit than less water intensive industry 
like food processing. Denote ܾ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ the benefit function from consuming ݔ௜  amount of 
water, where i = 1 stands for the upstream country and i = 2 the downstream country. In 
my case, country 1 is China and country 2 is India.  ݔ∗, which makes ܾሺݔ∗ሻ ൌ 0, is the 
satiated level, meaning before this level, more water gives country more benefit and 
exceeding this level, benefits decreases by more water, such as flood. ܾᇱሺݔሻ ൒
0	ݓ݄݁݊	ݔ ൑ ݔ∗ܽ݊݀	ܾᇱሺݔሻ ൏ 0	ݓ݄݁݊	ݔ ൐ ݔ∗; ܾᇱᇱሺݔሻ ൑ 0. Therefore, countries, especially 
from downstream expect upstream countries to control water release in the latter case. In 
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Ambec et al. (2010), the fair allocation of water resources among trans-boudary countries 
is the mean flow. However, it is fair to consider average per capita water consumption 
level into the water resource reallocation. China and India has merely the same 
population, and therefore, for analytical simplicity, I kept their populations the same. The 
fair allocation, therefore, is to equalize the benefits of two countries, that is when 
ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൌ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ, where ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵ ൌ ݔොଶ െ ݁ଶ and ݔොଵ ൑ ݔଵ∗, ݔොଶ ൑ ݔଶ∗.  
i. Downstream Incremental River Sharing Agreement (DIRSA) : 
Agreement is to let China transfer the amount of water ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵ and India receive 
ݔොଶ െ ݁ଶ 
ݒଵௗ ൌ ݒሺ1ሻ ൌ ܾଵሺݔଵሻ ൌ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵௗ 
ݐଵௗ ൌ ݒଵௗ െ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ 
ݐଶௗ ൌ ݐଵௗ 
ݒ is the welfare for each country, which is represented by the benefit function 
ܾሺݔሻ . Superscripts stand for the index of water sharing agreement scheme 
(d=downstream, u=upstream). ݐ  is the payment transfer in exchange of more water 
control. Negative value means the payment for the water to the other country, and 
positive value, on the contrary, means receiving payment from the other country.   
 
ii. Upstream Incremental River Sharing Agreement (UIRSA): 
ݒଵ௨ ൌ ݒሺ1,2ሻ െ ݒሺ2ሻ ൌ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ܾଶሺݔଶሻ 
ݐଵ௨ ൌ ݒଵ௨ െ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ ൌ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െ ܾଶሺݔଶሻ 
ݐଶ௨ ൌ ݐଵ௨ 
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2.2.1.2 Dry season 
 Assume that in the dry season, China only controls ݁ଵ′ units of water: ݁ଵᇱ ൏ ݁ଵ, 
but under the agreement, China still has to transfer ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵ  units to India. Then the 
welfare of China with DIRSA during dry season, denoted as ݒଵௗ,ௗ, becomes: 
ݒଵௗ,ௗ ൌ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻሻ ൅ ݐଵௗ ൌ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻሻ ൅ ܾଵሺݔଵሻ െ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ  
If ݒଵௗ,ௗ ൑ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ, then China has an incentive to deviate from the agreement 
during the dry season.  
And with UIRSA, China’s welfare, ݒଵ௨,ௗ, is: 
ݒଵ௨,ௗ ൌ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻሻ ൅ ݐଵ௨ ൌ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻሻ ൅ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െ ܾଶሺݔଶሻ 
ൌ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺݔොଶ െ ݁ଶሻሻ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ܾଶሺݔଶሻ 
Ambec and Dinar (2010) proved that the downstream incremental River Share 
Agreement is not sustainable in more severe drought, but the constrained (when water 
consumption and controlled water are less than the satiated levelሻ upstream incremental 
RSA is. Therefore, China has no motivation to deviate from the agreement under such 
circumstances. However, their River Sharing Agreement is presumed that India makes 
monetary transfer (victim payment) to China in exchange of water share from upstream. 
Also, the water sharing game with side payment demonstrated belowdoes not guarantee 
this (share, pay) interaction.  
In this game, China has the action set (share, not share), which is denoted as 
ܽଵ ∋ ሺܵ, ܰܵሻ. India’s action ܽଶ is chosen from the action set (pay, not pay), denoted as 
ܽଶ ∈ ሺܲ, ܰܲሻ . The normal water sharing game (with externality) is demonstrated in 
Figure 2-1. 
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 India 
  Pay       Not Pay  
China Share            	ݒଵ௨,ௗ , ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻሻ , ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ 
Not Share ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ ൅ ݐଵ௨ ,  ܾଶሺ݁ଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, ܾଶሺ݁ଶሻ 
Figure 2-1 Game 1:  Water Sharing Game With Side Payment 
	
In each cell, the first payoff is China’s welfare and the second is India’s. I use 
the welfare from the constrained upstream incremental scheme as the payoffs of (share, 
pay). When India chooses to make a payment for sharing, China chooses not to share the 
river and India Pays the amount of ݐଶ௨  to China, which makes China’s welfare ݒଵ௨,ௗ ൌ
ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻሻ ൅ ݐଵ௨, and India’s welfare ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨. Clearly, for China, ‘Not Share’ 
is the dominant strategy and for India, the strategy ‘Not Pay’ dominates ‘Pay’. Hence, the 
Nash equilibrium in this river sharing game is when China does not share and India does 
not pay. To simplify analysis, subtract the first payoff in each cell by ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, and the 
second payoff by ܾଶሺ݁ଶሻ. Therefore, the new water sharing pay-off matrix becomes as 
follows: 
Obviously this non-cooperative result is not what the countries prefer, and for 
this prisoner’s dilemma game between two countries, players do not usually choose 
“single-shot” interaction. Bennet et al. (1998) proved that infinite repeated game with 
certain discount factor could result (share, pay). The area under solid lines in Figure 2 
shows the feasible results for the infinite repeated game. The possible payoffs are the 
intersection of two axes and the frontier point in the first quadrant: (0, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ tଶ௨ ൅
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௧మೠ
௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲିሺ௘భି௫ොభ൯ሻ
 (ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ)), (ݐଵ௨ െ ௩భ
ೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲ൯ି௧భೠ,
௕మሺ௫ොమሻ ݐଶ
௨, 0), (ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ
ݐଶ௨). 
 
Simplified Game 1 India 
  Pay       Not Pay  
China Share          	ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, 
 ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶሻ 
ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ,  
ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶሻ 
Not Share ݐଵ௨	,			 െݐଶ௨ 0,0 
Figure 2-2 Simplified water sharing game 
 
It has been proved, however, by Maler (1990) that victim payment in an 
agreement is not preferable for the victim country (India in this case) because it makes 
the victim country have a weak negotiation power. Therefore, I choose the interconnected 
game, which was introduced by (Folmer 1993) to solve this transboundary river sharing 
problem. Just and Netanyahu (2004) summarized that interconnected game are preferable 
if when (1) each player has an advantage over the other player in at least one issue, (2) 
the asymmetry of advantages is sufficiently comparable in magnitude, and (3) 
interconnection expands the set of feasible strategies. 
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Figure 2-3 Possible frontier of repeated game on water sharing 
	
Even though the victim payment in an agreement is not politically appealing, yet 
it is still useful for the payoff calculation in a game. So far, both cooperative and non-
cooperative results are not preferable for the international community. In order to achieve 
another result, especially (share, not pay), I create an asymmetric and independent game 
in which India has comparative strength over China. Therefore, linking two games, a 
sustainable equilibrium can be possibly found. That is to say, in this asymmetric game, 
India has some kind of credible threat to China to make China choose to share the river in 
the River Sharing Game. In the other game, in another word, India has stronger 
negotiation leverage compared to China, so that at the end there will be a win-win for 
both China and India. Like in Just et al. (2004), the other game can use the boarder issue 
game in which the downstream country has more advantage.  
0,
v1
u,d  b1(e1' ), b2 (xˆ2 ) t2u
t1
u,t2u
b1(e1
'  (e1  xˆ1' )) b1(e'1), b2 (xˆ2 )
X		China	 
Y	India 
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China and India have been having trade and border security issues in recent 
times.  Even in 2013, there was a military conflict between the two countries at the Indo-
Tibetan boarder. China places ‘harmonious development’ one of the most important place 
in its economic development.  Therefore, India could agree to support China to keep the 
border peaceful in exchange for China to share the river. However, this broad issue game 
is not politically or economically preferred. First of all, destroying the border peace might 
not be a “creditable threat” to China since India does not gain much benefit from it. 
Secondly, it is not a long-term strategy since border issue will be solved eventually.  
Currently China is planning to invest 300 billion dollars on India’s infrastructure, 
such as railroad, Medicare, and etc., but India is hesitating whether or not to accept this 
offer because of political reasons (since it might cause national security issue).  
Meanwhile, Japan also have the same intendancy to invest to India, therefore, India could 
use this opportunity to ask China to import more products from India, such as iron ore.  
That is, India will agree to accept China’s investment on its infrastructure, but China has 
to import more iron ore every year. Payoffs of this game are presented as the utility 
function ࢁ  with the superscript denoting the players and subscript denoting the cell 
position.  
The area under the solid lines in Figure 2-5 represents the possible frontier when 
repeating this game infinitely.  Therefore, the possible payoffs of this repeated game are 
(0, ଵܷଶ ൅ ௎భ
మି௎మమ
௎భభି௎మభ ଵܷ
ଵ), ( ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, 0),( ଵܷଵ, ଵܷଶ), which are the intersection of Y axis, X 
axis and the frontier point in the first quadrant. Where ܷଷଵ ൐ ଵܷଵ ൐ 0 ൐ ܷଶଵ, and ܷଶଶ ൐
ଵܷଶ ൐ 0 ൐ ܷଷଶ, so that it is still a prisoner’s dilemma game. The Nash Equilibrium 
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 India 
  Accept 
investment  
Not accept 
Investment 
China Import iron  ଵܷଵ ,  ଵܷଶ ܷଶଵ ,  ܷଶଶ 
Not import iron ܷଷଵ , ܷଷଶ 0, 0 
Figure 2-4 Game 2: trade game 
	
is for India to “Not accept investment” and for china to “not import iron”. Meanwhile, to 
make this game work interconnected with the water sharing game, assume that for China, 
ܷଷଵ ൐ ݐଵ௨	, and ଵܷଵ ൐ ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ,  on the one hand, China will gain more benefit from 
the investment to India than not to share the river, on the other hand, the harm to China 
caused by sharing the river but not get paid than is less than that from import iron from 
India but rejected to invest, i.e. ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻሻ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ ൐ ܷଶଵ. 
For India, on the one hand, the gain from water shared by China is greater than that from 
the iron ore export to china, i.e. ଵܷଶ ൏ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ and ܷଶଶ ൏ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ. On the other hand, 
the harm to India to accept the investment from china but does not get to export the iron 
ore is less than that from making the side payment but does not get shared. i.e. ܷଷଶ ൐
െݐଶ௨ .  Therefore, interconnecting those two games, China might be willing to share the 
river in order to win the investment opportunity in India. First of all, let us examine the 
simple aggregated payoffs of the two games, which are presented below. 
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Figure 2-5 Possible frontier of repeated trade game 
	
  Therefore, the payoffs that are dominated by others will be ignored and the 
ones that are not dominated consist the possible frontier. Figure 2.6  demonstrates this 
result, with the frontier points 
 (ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ ൅ ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨),  
(ݐଵ௨ െ ௩భ
ೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲ൯ି௧భೠ,
௕మሺ௫ොమሻ ݐଶ
௨ ൅ ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, 0),  
( ଵܷଵ,	 ଵܷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ൅ ௧మ
ೠሺ௩భೠ,೏ି௕భሺ௘భᇲሻሻ
௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲିሺ௘భି௫ොభ൯ሻ
), ( ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ൅
௧మೠሺ௩భೠ,೏ି௕భሺ௘భᇲሻሻ
௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲିሺ௘భି௫ොభ൯ሻ
 ),  
(0, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ൅
௧మೠ൬௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲ൯൰
௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲିሺ௘భି௫ොభ൯ሻ
൅ ଵܷଶ ൅ ௎భ
మି௎మమ
௎భభି௎మభ ଵܷ
ଵ
0,0 
X		China	 
Y	India 
U2,
1U2
2
U1,
1U1
2
U3,
1U3
2
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Table 2-1 Aggregated isolated game (Refer to the points in Figure2-5) 
	
Payoffs of water sharing 
game 
Payoffs of trade 
game 
Aggregated payoffs Other payoffs that dominate 
this one 
(0, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ൅
௧మೠ
௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲିሺ௘భି௫ොభ൯ሻ
 (ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ
ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ)) 
(0, ଵܷଶ ൅ ௎భ
మି௎మమ
௎భభି௎మభ ଵܷ
ଵ) (0, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ൅
௧మೠ൬௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲ൯൰
௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲିሺ௘భି௫ොభ൯ሻ
൅ ଵܷଶ ൅ ௎భ
మି௎మమ
௎భభି௎మభ ଵܷ
ଵ)  
 
(0, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ൅
௧మೠ
௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲିሺ௘భି୶ොభ൯ሻ
 (ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ
ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ)) 
( ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, 0) ( ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ൅
௧మೠሺ௩భೠ,೏ି௕భሺ௘భᇲሻሻ
௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲିሺ௘భି௫ොభ൯ሻ
 ) 
 
(0, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ൅
௧మೠ
௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲିሺ௘భି௫ොభ൯ሻ
 (ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ
ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ)) 
( ଵܷଵ, ଵܷଶ) ( ଵܷଵ, ଵܷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ൅
௧మೠሺ௩భೠ,೏ି௕భሺ௘భᇲሻሻ
௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲିሺ௘భି௫ොభ൯ሻ
) 
 
(ݐଵ௨ െ ௩భ
ೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲ൯ି௧భೠ,
௕మሺ௫ොమሻ ݐଶ
௨, 0) (0, ଵܷଶ ൅ ௎భ
మି௎మమ
௎భభି௎మభ ଵܷ
ଵ) ሺݐଵ௨ െ ௩భ
ೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲ൯ି௧భೠ,
௕మሺ௫ොమሻ ݐଶ
௨, ଵܷଶ ൅
௎భమି௎మమ
௎భభି௎మభ ଵܷ
ଵ) 
( ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ
ݐଶ௨ ൅ ௧మ
ೠሺ௩భೠ,೏ି௕భሺ௘భᇲሻሻ
௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲିሺ௘భି௫ොభ൯ሻ
 ) 
(ݐଵ௨ െ ௩భ
ೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲ൯ି௧భೠ,
௕మሺ௫ොమሻ ݐଶ
௨, 0) ( ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, 0) (ݐଵ௨ െ ௩భ
ೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲ൯ି௧భೠ,
௕మሺ௫ොమሻ ݐଶ
௨ ൅ ଵܷଵ ൅
௎భభି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, 0) 
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Table 2-1 (Continued) Aggregated isolated game 
 
 
 
(ݐଵ௨ െ ௩భ
ೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲ൯ି௧భೠ,
௕మሺ௫ොమሻ ݐଶ
௨, 0) ( ଵܷଵ, ଵܷଶ) (ݐଵ௨ െ ௩భ
ೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲ൯ି௧భೠ,
௕మሺ௫ොమሻ ݐଶ
௨ ൅ ଵܷଵ, ଵܷଶ) (ݒଵ
௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ ൅ ଵܷଵ ൅
௎భభି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨) 
(ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െݐଶ௨) 
(0, ଵܷଶ ൅ ௎భ
మି௎మమ
௎భభି௎మభ ଵܷ
ଵ) (ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ൅ ଵܷଶ ൅
௎భమି௎మమ
௎భభି௎మభ ଵܷ
ଵ) 
( ଵܷଵ, ଵܷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ൅
௧మೠሺ௩భೠ,೏ି௕భሺ௘భᇲሻሻ
௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲିሺ௘భି௫ොభ൯ሻ
) 
(ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െݐଶ௨) 
( ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, 0) (ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ ൅ ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, 
ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨) 
 
(ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െݐଶ௨) 
( ଵܷଵ, ଵܷଶ) (ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ ൅ ଵܷଵ, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ൅
ଵܷଶ) 
( ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ
ݐଶ௨ ൅ ௧మ
ೠሺ௩భೠ,೏ି௕భሺ௘భᇲሻሻ
௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲିሺ௘భି௫ොభ൯ሻ
 ) 
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Figure 2-6 Possible frontier of aggregated game 
 
Then the interconnected game are represented as the following Table 2-2. Each 
country has eight combined strategies and payoffs for each player is calculated as the 
ones shown in the matrix cells.  The values of the payoffs are aggregated from Game 1 
and Game 2. For example, if China chooses to not share the water but import iron from 
India, and India makes a side payment in order for China to share the water, and not 
accept the investment project, then the payoffs for China and India are respectively 
ܷଶଵ ൅ ݐଵ௨ and ܷଶଶ െ ݐଵ௨. The same reasoning as the simple aggregated game, the possible 
frontier should be the payoffs that are not dominated by any one. 
It is proven that (column two, row four) is dominated by (column one, row four), 
(column three, row three) is dominated by (column one, row one), etc.. 
0,0 
X  China  
Y India 
Aggregated 
frontier 
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Table 2-2 Interconnected game 
 India 
 
 
 Pay/ 
Accept 
investment 
Pay/ 
Not accept 
Investment 
Not Pay/ 
Accept 
Investment 
Not Pay/ 
Not accept 
Investment 
China Share/ 
Import 
 
ଵܷଵ ൅ ݒଵ௨,ௗܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ,  
ଵܷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨
ܷଶଵ ൅ ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, ܷଶଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ 
ଵܷଵ ൅ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻሻെܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, ଵܷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ 
ܷଶଵ ൅ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻሻെܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, ܷଶଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ 
Share/ 
Not 
Import 
ܷଷଵ ൅ ݒଵ௨,ௗܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ,  ܷଷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨
ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ,  ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ 
ܷଷଵ ൅ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻሻെܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, ܷଷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ 
ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻሻ െܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ 
Not 
Share/ 
Import 
ଵܷଵ ൅ ݐଵ௨, ଵܷଶ െ ݐଵ௨ ܷଶଵ ൅ ݐଵ௨, ܷଶଶ െ ݐଵ௨ ଵܷଵ, 
ଵܷଶ 
ܷଶଵ, ܷଶଶ 
Not 
Share/ 
Not 
Import 
ܷଷଵ ൅ ݐଵ௨, ܷଷଶ െ ݐଵ௨ ݐଵ௨, െݐଵ௨ ܷଷଵ, ܷଷଶ 
0, 
0 
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From Table 2.2, it is not hard to get that the frontier payoffs are (ܷଷଵ ൅ ݐଵ௨, 
ܷଷଶ െ ݐଵ௨), ( ଵܷଵ ൅ ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ,  ଵܷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨), ( ଵܷଵ ൅ ݐଵ௨, ଵܷଶ െ ݐଵ௨), (ܷଷଵ ൅ ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ
ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ,   ܷଷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ), ( ܷଶଵ ൅ ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ , ܷଶଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ), ( ଵܷଵ ൅
ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻሻ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, ଵܷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ ), (ܷଷଵ ൅ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻሻ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, ܷଷଶ ൅
ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ), ሺܷଶଵ ൅ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻሻ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, ܷଶଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ).   
Compared to the frontier with the aggregated ones, (ݒଵ௨,ௗ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ ൅ ଵܷଵ ൅
௎భభି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ , ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ), ( ݐଵ௨ െ ௩భ
ೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲ൯ି௧భೠ,
௕మሺ௫ොమሻ ݐଶ
௨ ൅ ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ , 0), ( ଵܷଵ , 	 ଵܷଶ ൅
ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ൅ ௧మ
ೠሺ௩భೠ,೏ି௕భሺ௘భᇲሻሻ
௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲିሺ௘భି௫ොభ൯ሻ
), ( ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ൅ ௧మ
ೠሺ௩భೠ,೏ି௕భሺ௘భᇲሻሻ
௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲିሺ௘భି௫ොభ൯ሻ
 ), 
(0, ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ െ ݐଶ௨ ൅
௧మೠ൬௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲ൯൰
௩భೠ,೏ି௕భ൫௘భᇲିሺ௘భି௫ොభ൯ሻ
൅ ଵܷଶ ൅ ௎భ
మି௎మమ
௎భభି௎మభ ଵܷ
ଵ ) , and it is proven that  payoff 
frontier in interconnected game dominates all the payoffs in the aggregated game. Based 
on those combined possibilities, India, as the downstream country could change its 
payoffs (with the superscript 2) in the contract to force china to share the water in the dry 
season. 
 The possible frontier of interconnect game is shown in figure 6. To avoid the 
side payment, feasible frontier are ( ܷଷଵ ൅ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻሻ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, ܷଷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ) and 
( ଵܷଵ ൅ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱ െ ሺ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻሻ െ ܾଵሺ݁ଵᇱሻ, ଵܷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔොଶሻ ). That is when India chooses to not 
make a side payment for the river sharing, but accept China to implement the investment 
project, and China agree to share the river, but either import or not import iron ore from 
India does not harm neither country. 
60 
 
Figure 2-7 Possible frontier of interconnected game in dry season 
	
2.2.1.3 Flood season 
 
               Very few studies have discussed about trans-boundary countries interaction with 
each other when there is flood. During the monsoon season (June–October), floods are a 
common occurrence. Deforestation in the Brahmaputra watershed has resulted in 
increased siltation levels, flash floods, and soil erosion in critical downstream habitat 
such as the Kaziranga National Park in middle Assam Occasionally, massive flooding 
causes huge losses to crops, life and property. Periodic flooding is a natural phenomenon, 
which is ecologically important because it helps maintain the lowland grasslands and 
associated wildlife. Periodic floods also deposit fresh alluvium replenishing the fertile 
soil of the Brahmaputra River Valley. Thus flooding, Agriculture, and agricultural 
0,0 
X  China  
Y India 
Aggregated 
frontier 
Interconnected	 game	
frontier 
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practices are closely connected. Water resource department and the Brahmaputra Board 
take flood control measures but until now the flood problem remains unsolved. At least a 
third of the Land of Majuli Island has been eroded by the mighty river. Recently it is 
suggested that a highway protected by concrete mat along the river and excavation of the 
riverbed can curb this menace (Shrivastava et al, 2005).. This project, named The 
Brahmaputra River Restoration Project, is yet to be approved by the Government. 
                During this season, downstream country (India) certainly would desire less 
water or flood control from upstream country (China) once the river flow is above its 
satiated level, China instead tends to release more water to downstream to avoid upstream 
flood. I can picture different scenarios. First of all, China will release the excess water to 
India until reaching India’s satiated level, and the released water fills exactly up to India’s 
satiated water level. Of course in this case China is willing to share and India does not 
have to pay for it. I will not discuss this scenario in detail. Secondly, there is too much 
excessive water in the upstream. If China releases all the excessive water to India, which 
causes flood in the latter country, the water released from China makes India’s water 
level exceed its satiated level), then India expect China to take some measure to control 
the flood. In this situation, either downstream incremental or constrained upstream 
incremental River Sharing Agreement is not appropriate, since the method to equalize 
both countries’ benefit will not work. However, I will use the similar setups as the 
scenario of dry season. 
Agreement is to let China control water flow, and release the amount of water 
݁ଵ െ ݔොଵ  and India receives this amount of water and just fill up its satiated level ݔଶ∗ . 
Therefore, ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵ ൌ ݔଶ∗ െ ݁ଶ , where ݁ଵ and ݁ଶ are water controlled by China and India. 
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India will pay China to control the flood upstream, and therefore, China will have more 
water than its satiated level, i.e.  ݔොଵ ൐ ݔଵ∗. 
ݒଵ ൌ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ ൌ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ 
ݐଵ ൌ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ െ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ 
െݐଵ ൌ ݐଶ 
ݒ is the welfare for each country, which is represented by the benefit function 
ܾሺݔሻ. Since ݔොଵ ൐ ݔଵ∗,  ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൏ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ. Superscripts stand for the index of water sharing 
agreement scheme.  ݐ is the payment transfer in exchange of flood control. The payment 
is to compensate upstream country for control the river flood which exceeds its satiated 
level. Negative value means the payment for the water to the other country, and positive 
value, on the contrary, means receiving payment from the other country. For India, its 
welfare function is  
ݒଶ ൌ ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ െ ݐଶ 
ݐଶ ൌ ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ െ ݒଶ ൌ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െ ݒଶ 
ݐଵ ൌ െݐଶ 
Therefore, the water sharing game becomes India pays China to control the 
volume of water, and the payoff matrix is as Figure 2-8: 
 
 
 
 India 
  Pay       Not Pay      
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China Control  ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ,ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െ ݐଶ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ, ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ 
Not Control   ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ ݐଵ,ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ െ ݐଶ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ, ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ xଵ∗ሻ 
Figure 2-8 water sharing game under flood season 
To simplify the analysis, subtract (ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ, ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ) in each cell of the 
payoff matrix above. The new game is as below: 
 
 India 
  Pay       Not Pay      
China Control  ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ, 
ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െ ݐଶ 
െܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ 
ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ, 
ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ-ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ 
Not 
Control   
ݐଵ, െݐଶ 0,0  
 
Figure 2-9 simplified water sharing game under flood season 
	
In the scenario of wet season, payoffs have the relationship: ݐଵ ൐ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ െ
ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ ൐ 0 ൐ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ  and ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ ൐ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െ
ݐଶ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ ൐ 0 ൐ െݐଶ. Clearly, this is also a game of prisoner’s dilemma and 
its Nash Equilibrium of single play is when India does not make a side payment and 
China does not control the flood. Infinite repeat game results the following payoff 
frontier as shown in figure 2-10. 
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Figure 2-10 Possible frontier in repeated water sharing game under flood season 
	
Same analysis is conducted as the one in dry season. The infinite repeated game 
results the possible frontier: ( ି௧మሾ௕భሺ௫ොభሻି௕భሺ௫భ
∗ሻሿ
௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫భ∗ሻ ൅ ݐଵ ,0), ( ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ െ
ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ , 	ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െ ݐଶ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ  ), (0, 	ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ 
௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௫మ∗ሻ
௧భ ሺܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ
∗ሻሻ). To avoid the Nash Equilibrium of this game, India 
could also use the same trade game to constrain China’s water sharing behavior. Let us 
examine the payoffs from simple aggregation of two games
0,
X  
China  
Y India 
t1,t2
(b1(xˆ1) b1(x*1), b2 (x*2 )b2 (e2  e1  x*1))
(b1(xˆ1) t1  b1(x*1), b2 (e2  e1  xˆ1) t2 b2 (e2  e1  x*1))
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Table 2-3 Aggregated game under flood season (refer to the point in figure 2-10) 
Payoffs of flood control 
game 
Payoffs of trade game Aggregated payoffs Other payoffs that  
dominates this one 
(0,	ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ ௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௫మ∗ሻ
௧భ ሺܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻሻ) 
(0, ଵܷଶ ൅ ௎భ
మି௎మమ
௎భభି௎మభ ଵܷ
ଵ) (0, ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ ௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௫మ∗ሻ
௧భ ሺܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െ
ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ ଵܷଶ ൅ ௎భ
మି௎మమ
௎భభି௎మభ ଵܷ
ଵ)  
 
(0,	ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ ௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௫మ∗ሻ
௧భ ሺܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻሻ) 
( ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, 0) ( ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ െ
ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ ௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௫మ∗ሻ
௧భ ሺܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ ) 
 
(0,	ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ ௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௫మ∗ሻ
௧భ ሺܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻሻ) 
( ଵܷଵ, ଵܷଶ) ( ଵܷଵ, ଵܷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ െܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ ௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௫మ∗ሻ
௧భ ሺܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ) 
 
(ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ െܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ,	ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െݐଶ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ ) 
(0, ଵܷଶ ൅ ௎భ
మି௎మమ
௎భభି௎మభ ଵܷ
ଵ) (ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ, ଵܷଶ ൅௎భమି௎మమ
௎భభି௎మభ ଵܷ
ଵ ൅ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െ
ݐଶ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ) 
( ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ െ
ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ ௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௫మ∗ሻ
௧భ ሺܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ ) 
(ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ െܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ,	ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െݐଶ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ ) 
( ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, 0) (ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ ൅௎భభି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െ
ݐଶ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ) 
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(ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ െܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ,	ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െݐଶ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ ) 
( ଵܷଵ, ଵܷଶ) (ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ ଵܷଵ, 
ଵܷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െ ݐଶ െܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ) 
( ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ െ
ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ 
௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௫మ∗ሻ
௧భ ሺܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ ) 
( ି௧మሾ௕భሺ௫ොభሻି௕భሺ௫భ
∗ሻሿ
௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫భ∗ሻ ൅ݐଵ,0) 
(0, ଵܷଶ ൅ ௎భ
మି௎మమ
௎భభି௎మభ ଵܷ
ଵ) ( ି௧మሾ௕భሺ௫ොభሻି௕భሺ௫భ
∗ሻሿ
௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫భ∗ሻ ൅ ݐଵ, 
௎భమି௎మమ
௎భభି௎మభ ଵܷ
ଵ) 
( ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ െ
ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ ௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௫మ∗ሻ
௧భ ሺܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ ) 
( ି௧మሾ௕భሺ௫ොభሻି௕భሺ௫భ
∗ሻሿ
௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫భ∗ሻ ൅ݐଵ,0) 
( ଵܷଵ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, 0) ( ି௧మሾ௕భሺ௫ොభሻି௕భሺ௫భ
∗ሻሿ
௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫భ∗ሻ ൅ ݐଵ, 0) 
 
( ି௧మሾ௕భሺ௫ොభሻି௕భሺ௫భ
∗ሻሿ
௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫భ∗ሻ ൅ݐଵ,0) 
( ଵܷଵ, ଵܷଶ) ( ି௧మሾ௕భሺ௫ොభሻି௕భሺ௫భ∗ሻሿ௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫భ∗ሻ ݐଵ, ଵܷ
ଶ) (ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ ൅௎భభି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ
ݔොଵሻ െ ݐଶ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െݔଵ∗ሻ) 
Table 2-3 Aggregated game under flood season (continued) 
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The aggregated payoff frontier is  
( ି௧మሾ௕భሺ௫ොభሻି௕భሺ௫భ
∗ሻሿ
௕మሺ௘మାୣభି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫భ∗ሻ ൅ ݐଵ, 0), 
 (ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ ௎భ
భି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െ ݐଶ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ),  
( ଵܷଵ, 	 ଵܷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ ௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௫మ
∗ሻ
௧భ ሺܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ
∗ሻ), ( ଵܷଵ ൅
௎భభି௎మభ
௎భమି௎యమ ଵܷ
ଶ, ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ ௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௫మ
∗ሻ
௧భ ሺܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ
∗ሻ ),  
(0, ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ ൅ ௕మሺ௘మା௘భି௫ොభሻି௕మሺ௫మ
∗ሻ
௧భ ሺܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ
∗ሻ ൅ ଵܷଶ ൅ ௎భ
మି௎మమ
௎భభି௎మభ ଵܷ
ଵ) 
and is as shown as the dash line in figure 2-11 
 
Figure 2-11 Possible frontier of aggregated game 
Next, examining the payoffs of interconnected game. It is shown as the matrix as 
below.
0,0 
X  
China  
Y India 
Aggregated 
frontier 
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Table 2-4 Interconnected game under flood season 
 India 
  Pay/Accept 
investment 
Pay/Not accept 
Investment 
Not Pay/Accept 
Investment 
Not Pay/Not accept 
Investment 
China Control/Imp
ort 
 
ଵܷଵ ൅ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ െܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ,  ଵܷଶ ൅ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െݐଶ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െݔଵ∗ሻ 
ܷଶଵ ൅ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ െܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ, ܷଶଶ ൅ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െ ݐଶ െܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ 
ଵܷଵ ൅ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ,
ଵܷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ-ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ 
ܷଶଵ ൅ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻܷଶଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ-ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ 
Control/Not 
Import 
ܷଷଵ ൅ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ െܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ,  ܷଷଶ ൅ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െݐଶ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െݔଵ∗ሻ 
ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ ൅ ݐଵ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ,  ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔොଵሻ െݐଶ െ ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ 
ܷଷଵ ൅ ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ,ܷଷଶ ൅ ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ-ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െ ݔଵ∗ሻ 
ܾଵሺݔොଵሻ െ ܾଵሺݔଵ∗ሻ,  ܾଶሺݔଶ∗ሻ-ܾଶሺ݁ଶ ൅ ݁ଵ െݔଵ∗ሻ 
Not Control 
/Import 
ଵܷଵ ൅ ݐଵ, ଵܷଶ െ ݐଵ ܷଶଵ ൅ ݐଵ, ܷଶଶ െ ݐଵ ଵܷଵ, 
ଵܷଶ 
ܷଶଵ, ܷଶଶ 
Not Control 
/Not Import 
ܷଷଵ ൅ ݐଵܷଷଶ െ ݐଵ ݐଵ, െݐଵ ܷଷଵ, ܷଷଶ 
0, 
0 
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The payoff frontier of interconnected game is shown in figure 13. Comparing to 
the aggregated frontier, it is clear that the former one has wider range of strategy choices 
and outcomes. The feasible frontier points are the underlines ones. Meanwhile, to avoid 
the side payment, strategy not side payment but accept the investment project can be 
chosen for India. And China controls river flow but chooses either import iron ore or not. 
 
Figure 2-12 Possible frontier of interconnected game vs. aggregated game under flood season 
	
2.3. Numerical Example 
Suppose in normal season, China controls 100 units of water, ݁ଵ ൌ 100. And 
India controls 60 units, ݁ଶ ൌ 60. Both countries have the same benefit function ܾሺݔሻ ൌ
100ݔ െ 0.5ݔଶ, therefore, the satiated level for both countries are 100 units. Then the fair 
water allocation is 80 units, which means China sharing 20 units to India. Constrained 
upstream scheme makes the welfare function ݒଵ௨ ൌ 2ݒሺ1,2ሻ െ ݒሺ2ሻ ൌ 2ܾሺ80ሻ െ ܾሺ60ሻ 
0,0 
X  China  
Y 
Aggregated 
frontier 
Interconnected	
game	frontier 
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and the transfer should be ݐଵ௨ ൌ ݒଵ௨ െ ܾሺ80ሻ ൌ ܾሺ80ሻ െ ܾሺ60ሻ ൌ 4800 െ 4200 ൌ 600. 
Therefore, the agreement is that India pays China 600 for sharing 20 units of water.  
In dry season, China controls 90 units of water, ݁ଵ′ ൌ 90 and India still control 
the same units. With the agreement above, China still will share 20 units, but with the 
side payment, China’s welfare is ݒଵ௨ ൌ ܾሺ90 െ 20ሻ ൅ 600 ൌ 5150 ൐ ܾሺ1000ሻ ൌ 5000, 
which is the welfare of fair allocation in normal season. Therefore, China does not have 
incentive to deviate. The water sharing game is as the following: 
Game 1 India 
  Pay       Not Pay  
China Share       b(70)+600, b(80)- 600 b(70), b(80) 
Not 
Share 
b(90)+600, b(60)-600 b(90), b(60) 
Simplied  
Game 1 
India 
  Pay       Not Pay  
China Share       200,0 -400, 300 
Not 
Share 
600,-600 0, 0 
Figure	2‐13 Numerical Water Sharing Game 
 
N.E. is (0,0) or (not share, not pay) in the single play. The possible frontier 
with infinite playing is as Figure 2-14. 
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Figure 2-14 Possible frontier of repeated game on water sharing 
 
The frontier is (200,0) and (0,100),Next step is the trade game, and payoff are assume as 
below. 
 India 
Game 2  Accept 
investment  
Not accept 
Investment 
China Import iron  400,100 -600, 200 
Not import iron 800, -100 0, 0 
Infinitely repeated game is expressed as Figure 2-15 
(‐400,300) 
(‐600,600) 
(0,0) 
(200,0) X	China 
Y	India 
Possible	
frontier 
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Figure	2‐15	Infinite Repeated Water Sharing Game 
 
The possible frontier are (400,100), (0, 140) and (300,0). Aggregated isolated game is 
presented as below 
Payoffs of water 
sharing game 
Payoffs of trade 
game 
Aggregated 
payoffs 
Other payoffs that 
dominate this one 
(0,100) (0,140) (0,240)  
(0,100) (400,100) (500,200)  
(0,100) (300,0) (300,100) (600,100) 
(200,0) (0,140) (200,140) (300,200) 
(200,0) (400,100) (600,100)  
(200,0) (300,0) (500,0) (600,100), 
(500,200) 
So graphically it is presents as: 
(‐600,200) 
(800,‐100) 
(0,0) 
(400,100
X	China 
Y	India 
Possible 
frontier 
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The interconnected game: 
 India 
 
 
 Pay/ 
Accept 
investment 
Pay/ 
Not accept 
Investment 
Not Pay/ 
Accept 
Investmen
t 
Not Pay/ 
Not accept 
investment 
China Share/ 
Import 
 
600,100 -400,200 0,400 -1000,500 
Share/ 
Not Import 
1000,-300 200,0 400,200 -400,300 
Not Share/ 
Import 
1000,-500 0,-400 400,100 -600,200 
Not Share/ 
Not Import 
1400,-800 600,-600 800,-300 0,0 
 
(0,0) 
X	China 
Y	India 
Possible	aggregated	
frontier 
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Consider only the payoff sets are non-negative, and eliminate the ones dominated by any 
other one. Therefore, the frontier is shown as the underline. In this case, the mix strategy 
(Share/Not Import, Not Pay/Accept Investment) or payoff (400,200) is not better than the 
frontier of aggregated game. But the mix strategy (Share/ Import, Not Pay/Accept 
Investment) is better than the frontier of aggregated game. 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
Interconnected game provides broader vision of water management, especially 
to the trans-boundary water-sharing issues. Since China and India do not have any 
official water sharing agreement yet, this research might shed a light to an efficient way 
of designing a river sharing contract without side payment. I modeled an interconnected 
game linking water sharing game and international trade game. Model results shows that 
the frontier of interconnected game is higher than the aggregated game, and it is feasible 
for India to get water shared without side payment.  No literature so far has researched on 
the flood scenario, and the virtue of this paper is that extreme weather conditions are 
considered- drought and flood. I also proved that in flood season, neither the downstream 
incremental or constrained upstream incremental river sharing agreement would work.  
Then I constructed a new way to calculate the payoffs in the water sharing game. Even 
though the payoffs are quite different under two extreme weather, yet interconnect game 
are preferable than the aggregate game. India does not have to pay for China to control 
flood by agree to assign the infrastructure investment project to China. Experiment could 
be implemented in the future to test how efficient the interconnect game is and what the 
most preferable strategies people would choose under different weather condition. 
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CHAPTER 3                                                                                     
VIRTUAL WATER TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 
3.1. Introduction  
    As water scarcity becomes a major concern in countries around the world, the 
concept of 'virtual water' (Allan1993) has gained attention from water managers and 
researchers. ‘Virtual water’ is a measure of the total water used in producing a good or 
service. For instance, it takes 4,100 liters of water on average to produce one cotton shirt 
(medium sized, 500 gram). Hoeskstra and Huang (2003) report that 13% of the water 
used for crop production in the world gets exported to other countries in the form of 
virtual water. Some researchers have found shortcomings in using this measure (Frontier 
Economics, 2008). It does not differentiate the value of water from different sources; it 
does not provide any indication of environmental harm nor the extract limit of sustainable 
usage of water; it might not be economical to reduce the production of water-intensive 
commodity in order to use the same water to produce an alternative less water-intensive 
commodity, as ‘virtual water’ is implicitly assumed and is not re-usable. However, in a 
study on trade data of Middle Eastern states, Allan (1993) concluded that using 'virtual 
water trade' could solve some of the water scarce issues. For example, the only way for 
water-scarce region to survive is to import a large amount of food such as grain, livestock 
etc. The region, therefore, could purchase the agricultural products with water already 
embedded in, instead of depending on its own scarce water resources.  
Virtual water (VW) is essentially an embedded factor of production, and 
therefore, makes it an important economic concept.  However, as Remier (2012) points 
out, some economists are not keen on using VW as a legitimate economic concept, 
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especially in the context of trade.  Remier found three specific arguments made against 
VW in the literature.  First, Merrett (1997) disputes the legitimacy of using the term 
‘virtual water import’ since the water contained in imported products (VW) is much less 
than the actual water used in their production.   Second, Wichelns (2004) argues that VW 
only considers the absolute advantage but not comparative advantage, the fundamental 
economic principle underlying international trade (OCED 2050).  VW concept only 
addresses resource endowments (absolute advantage) and that it ignores the underlying 
differences in production technologies or opportunity costs between trading partners, 
which form the basis for comparative advantage.  Third, Ansink (2010) argues that the 
standard international trade model only provides a weak support to VW concept.  He also 
argued that VW fails to stand even certain empirical tests. However, Reimer (2012) 
systematically counter all the above three arguments and argue that relative water 
endowments of countries are the main sources of comparative cost advantage.  The 
comparative cost advantage arising due to VW may not be obvious but ‘latent.’  Reimer 
used a two countries, two factors (capital and water) and two goods model, by 
maximizing the firms’ profit with trade balance constraint, he proved the Heckscher-
Ohlin Theorem.  The comparative cost differences may not arise necessarily due to inter-
country technology differences in this case, but to the high costs of trade associated with 
the sector that is most VW-intense, i.e., agriculture.  Therefore, Reimer argue that VW 
must receive due consideration in evaluating trade-related efficiencies and welfare gains 
and losses.  The present study will expand Reimer’s idea to explicitly model trade-related 
welfare gains from importing a VW-rich commodity from another country in exchange 
for exporting a VW-free commodity.  
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Most researches on virtual water, only concerns agricultural products, such as 
wheat, grains, and etc. This study however includes industrial products and other 
products of virtual water. The key question that I try to address is how much water is 
saved for a water scarce country via import and what the local and global welfare gains 
will be. Are there policies (subsidies and taxes) to match the market economic welfare goals 
and other social welfare? Peterson et al, 2002 shed some light on the social welfare 
calculation with environmental externality when different policies applied. They 
constructed a two-countries, one agricultural good, two factors (land and non-land), 
model with externalities, and then by empirically test, they found out the optimal policy 
tool. It was predicted that all small countries support a positive land subsidies for the 
production of non-market agricultural good I will extend the international trade model of 
Reimer (2012) and Peterson et al. (2002) by explicitly integrating not only virtual water 
but also other environmental factors such as water pollution, water scarcity rent into a 
two country, two factors (water and non-water), two products general equilibrium trade 
model. One country produces only one water-embedded commodity with different 
technology and trade with each other. By solving the above modified general equilibrium 
model, I will determine the social welfare, which is the sum of consumer surplus 
representing the utility from consumption net of externality (such as environmental 
degradation or improvement), and producer surplus, representing the firm's profit. The 
model will result in equilibrium quantities and prices of water-embedded products. The 
quantity of water saved by virtual trade could be determined by the net import. 
Meanwhile, social planner may design policies such as subsidies and taxes to match the 
optimal social welfare with the market-determined welfare The above model is empirically 
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tested by using data from the USDA, FAOSTAT, World bank and USEIA (US Energy 
Information Administration).  USDA publishes national data on wheat consumptions, 
import, and average cost of growing wheat in United States. FAOSTAT provides wheat 
prices, production and food CPI in different countries all over the world. Real world oil 
price (taking inflation into account) is available from the databank of World Bank. USEIA 
provides data on domestic oil price in United States, oil production and consumption in US 
and Saudi Arabia. Using the above data, I will be able to estimate the various components 
of the general equilibrium model and compute welfare gains and losses from different 
market and policy scenarios.  
This paper concerns international efficiency of virtual water trade. From the data 
of www.waterfootprint.org, top net virtual water importers are North America and East 
Asia, however, the water scarce countries like African countries involve much less in the 
virtual water trade. My study will analyze the extent to which virtual water will influence 
the overall welfare, and if there is any need for policy intervention to align trade-related 
economic welfare goals with water-related environmental goals. I will also take the 
sustainability indicators into a general equilibrium model. Following Wurtenberger et al. 
[2006], environmental indicators such as pollution impacts of production is factored into 
the two-country trade model. 
I will focus on the water pollution, since as virtual water trade takes place, water 
pollution is 'transferred' to the exporting country. There will be a trade-of of 
environmental cost of water pollution and producer's or/and consumer's surplus. The model 
will solve for maximum social welfare, which is the sum of consumer surplus that consists of 
utility from demand and externality (such as environmental degradation or improvement), 
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and producer surplus that is the firm's profit.. By trading the virtual water products, world 
equilibrium price can be obtained by equating the home production and home demand plus 
foreign demand. My model also calculates how much water is saved by trading the virtual 
water products. Meanwhile, social planner can make policies such as subsidy or tax to match 
the optimal social welfare based on the results.  The model provides insights on VW-related 
policy solutions to domestic water scarcity issues, for instance, water transfer from South to 
North in China. By testing the data, some of the shortcomings of virtual water will be 
minimized.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the 
conceptual international trade model of virtual water. Some policy suggestions are made in 
Section 3.3. Section 3.4 explains the data from difference sources I will use to test the 
model developed in Section 3.2. In Section 3.5, I will simulate a model and use the data to 
estimate related parameter and test the variables needs in the model. Test results will be 
well explained in Section 3.6, and then section 3.7 will be the conclusion. 
3.2. Model  
3.2.1 Environment   
                Following the standard Heckscher–Ohlin trade model (Heckscher, 1919; Ohlin, 
1933), I assume that there are two countries, Home and Foreign, in the world producing 
the two commodities, one is water intensive and the other is less water intensive. Two 
factors will be input in the production of those two goods: water and non-water. The 
technology form of any products that are embedded with water, is expressed as its general 
transformation form (Peterson et al., 2002):  
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ܶሺݕଵ, ݕଶ, ܦ,ܹ, ௜ܰሻ ൌ 0         (3.1) 
 ܶሺݕଵ∗, ݕଶ∗, ܦ,ܹ∗, ௜ܰ∗ሻ ൌ 0	ሺ݅	 ൌ 	1, 2, . . . , ݊ሻ 
 Where y is the output of the product in question, D is a negatively valued damage from 
pollution, W is the input of water and Ni is the input of non- water. i is the index of non-
water based inputs. Both countries consume this commodity. All asterisks represent the 
foreign country. I assume that Home is a water scare country, while Foreign is water 
abundant. I will analyze the problem under the circumstances with and without trade. 
During the international virtual water trade, the environmental pollution or damage is 
being transferred as well. For example, with virtual water trade, the water abundant 
country (foreign country) will focus on producing the water intensive product and 
therefore, water in the Home country can be used for other more important sectors or in 
the future. At the same time, since the technologies of producing this product are different, 
then the production functions are as below:   
ݕଵ 	ൌ 	ܨଵሺ ଵܹ	, ଵܰ௜ሻ, ݕଵ∗ ൌ 	ܨଵ∗ሺ ଵܹ∗, ଵܰ௜∗ ሻ   
ݕଶ 	ൌ 	ܨଶሺ ଶܹ, ଶܰ௜ሻ, ݕଶ∗ ൌ 	ܨଶ∗ሺ ଶܹ∗, ଶܰ௜∗ ሻ 
Function D is the damage function which has the same functional form in every country. 
To simplify the problem, I assume that VW-related damage will is a function of 
production of good 1 and good 2, and in turn, a function of embedded factors of production.   
ܦ ൌ 	ܦሺܨଵሺ ଵܹ, ଵܰ௜ሻሻ 	ൌ 	ܦሺ ଵܹ, ଵܰ௜ሻ		
ܦ∗ 	ൌ 	ܦ∗ሺܨଵ∗ሺ ଵܹ∗, ଵܰ௜∗ ሻሻ 	ൌ 	ܦ∗ሺ ଵܹ∗, ଵܰ௜∗ ሻ 
Function ܨ and ܦ are both concave, twice differentiable and satisfy the 
general transformation form as follows  
ܶ	ሺܨଵሺ ଵܹ, ଵܰ௜ሻ, ܨଶሺ ଶܹ, ଶܰ௜ሻ, ܦሺ ଵܹ, ଵܰ݅ሻ,ܹ,ܰ݅ሻ 	ൌ 	0, ሺ݅	 ൌ 	1, 2, . . . , nሻ 
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ܶ∗ሺܨଵ∗ሺ ଵܹ∗, ଵܰ௜∗ ሻ, ܨଶ∗ሺ ଶܹ∗, ଶܰ௜∗ ሻ, ܦ∗ሺ ଵܹ∗, ௜ܰ∗ሻ,ܹ, ௜ܰሻ 	ൌ 	0, ሺ݅	 ൌ 	1, 2, . . . , ݊ሻ 
3.2.2  Autarky Economy  
 Under autarky economy, firms from home country are producing both commodities 
with the maximized profit. 
ߨ൫݌௬, ݌ௐ	, ݌ே௜	൯ ൌ 	݉ܽݔ	൛݌ଵܨଵሺ ଵܹ, ଵܰ௜ሻ ൅	݌ଶܨଶሺௐమ,ேమ೔ሻ െ	݌ௐሺ ଵܹ ൅	 ଶܹሻ െ ݌ே௜ሺ ଵܰ௜ ൅
	 ଶܰ௜ሻሽ	            (3.2) 
Therefore, taking first order conditions with respect to the input of water and non-
water factors, we obtain  
݌ௐ ൌ 	݌ଵܨଵௐభ ൌ 	݌ଶܨଶௐమ, ݌ே௜ 	ൌ 	 ݌ଵܨଵேଵ௜ 	ൌ 	 ݌ଶܨଶேଶ௜		
Since home country is supposed to be a relative water scarce country, it does not 
produce that commodity in big enough quantity to influence the world output price.  That is, 
it takes the world price as given. Factor price is equal to the value of its marginal 
productivity contributed to the final product. Since the price of good 1, the water 
intensive product, is taken as given, the factor price is completely determined by the 
value of the marginal productivity. 
ଵܹ	/ݕଵ 		ൌ 	 ܽଵ௪	, ଶܹ	/ݕଶ ൌ 	ܽଶ௪	, ଵܰ௜/ݕଵ ൌ 	 aଵ୒୧	, ଶܰ௜ 	/ݕଶ ൌ ܽଶே௜ 
ଵܹ∗/ݕଵ∗ 	ൌ 	ܽଵ௪∗ 	, ଶܹ∗	/ݕଶ∗ ൌ 	ܽଶ௪∗ 	, ଵܰ௜∗ /ݕଵ∗ ൌ 	ܽଵே∗ ௜	, ଶܰ୧∗ 	/ݕଶ∗ ൌ ܽଶே௜∗ 
This ratio above is the factor needed to produce one unit of good. i.e. ܽଵௐ is the amount 
of water needed for producing good 1 for the home country. When factor market in each 
country clears, ଵܹ 	൅ 	 ଶܹ 	ൌ 	ܹ, and ଵܰ௜ 	൅ 	 ଶܰ௜ 	ൌ 	 ௜ܰ . Same applies for the foreign 
country, where ଵܹ∗ 	൅ 	 ଶܹ∗ 	ൌ ܹ∗ and ଵܰ∗ 	൅ 	 ଶܰ∗ 	ൌ ܰ∗ . Perfect competitive market 
condition makes zero profit and free entry with  
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 ܽଵ௪݌௪ 	൅	ܽଵே௜݌ே௜ 	ൌ 	݌ଵ	 
ܽଶ௪݌௪ 	൅	ܽଶே௜	݌ே௜ 	ൌ 	 ݌ଶ		
Where ݌ௐ	, ேܲ௜ , and ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ stand for factor prices of water and non-water, price of good 1 
and good 2. Left hand side represents the average total cost of each good.  
ଵܹ/ ଵܰ௜ 		൐ 		 ଶܹ	/ ଶܰ௜ , 
Wଵ∗/ ଵܰ௜∗ 		൐ 		 ଶܹ∗	/ ଶܰ௜∗  
Therefore, 
ܽଵௐܽ1 ଵܰ௜
	൐ 	 ܽଶௐܽ2 ଶܰ௜
, ܽ ∗	ଵௐܽ ∗ 1 ଵܰ௜
	൐ 	 ܽ ∗ଶௐܽ ∗ 2 ଶܰ௜
And assume that home country is relatively water scarce, whereas foreign 
country is relatively water abundant. ܹ/ܰ݅		 ൏ ܹ∗/ܰ∗݅		 
3.2.2 Social Welfare (Autarky)  
                For the social planner, the problem is maximizing the social welfare, which is 
the sum of consumer surplus (the area between the demand curve and equilibrium price), 
and producer surplus (the firms' profit), net of water related environmental damage. 
ߗ௔௨௧௔௥௞௬ ൌ ݉ܽݔௐ,ே೔ሼ ׬ ሺ݌ଵሻ݀ሺ݌ଵሻஶ௣ොభ ൅ ׬ ሺ݌ଶሻ݀ሺ݌ଶሻ
ஶ
௣ොభ ൅ ݌ଵܨଵሺ ଵܹ, ଵܰ௜ሻ ൅ ݌ଶܨଶሺ ଶܹ, ଶܰ௜ሻ െ
	݌ௐ	ሺ ଵܹ ൅	 ଶܹሻ 	െ ∑݌ே௜ሺ ଵܰ௜ ൅ 	 ଶܰ௜ሻ െ ܥሺܨ	ሺ ଵܹ, ଵܰ௜ሻሻሽ	   (3.3)
Let ܿሺ݌ሻ be the consumption of the commodity, Market clears when 
ܿଵሺ݌ଵሻ 	ൌ 	ݕଵ 	ൌ 	ܨଵሺ ଵܹ, ଵܰ௜ሻ, ܿଶሺ݌ଶሻ 	ൌ 	ݕଶ 	ൌ 	ܨଶሺ ଶܹ, ଶܰ௜ሻ 
which is consumption/demand equals to the output. The product price	݌1, ݌2	, therefore, 
can be expressed as a function of ݌ଵ 	ൌ 	݌ଵሺ ଵܹ, ଵܰ௜ሻ, ݌ଶ 	ൌ 	݌ଶሺ ଶܹ, ଶܰ௜ሻ. 
And	ܥሺܨ	ሺ ଵܹ, ଵܰ௜ሻሻ is the social cost function, a concave, twice differentiable function of 
production. Social cost includes the opportunity cost of using the water to the other usage, 
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cost of water pollution cleaning and the user cost which is the scarcity rent for future usage. 
It is assumed that only good 1 or water-intensive good production generates social cost, 
and the externalities from the production of good 2, less water-intensive good is ignored. 
Solving this social optimal problem:  
െܿଵሺ݌ଵሻ డ௣భడௐభ 		൅ 	
డ௣భ
డௐభ ܨଵሺ. ሻ ൅	݌ଶܨଵௐభ െ ܥிܨଵௐభ 	ൌ 	݌ௐ     (3.4) 
െܿଵሺ݌ଵሻ డ௣భడேభ 	൅	
డ௣భ
డேభ ܨଵሺ. ሻ ൅	݌ଵܨଵேభ೔ െ ܥிܨଵேభ೔೔ ൌ 	݌ேଵ௜     (3.5) 
െܿଶሺ݌ଶሻ డ௣మడௐమ 		൅ 	
డ௣మ
డௐమ ܨଶሺ. ሻ ൅	݌ଶܨଶௐమ െ ܥிܨଶௐమ 	ൌ 	݌ௐ     (3.6) 
െܿଶሺ݌ଶሻ డ௣భడேభ 		൅ 	
డ௣భ
డேభ ܨଶሺ. ሻ ൅	݌ଶܨଶேమ೔ െ ܥிܨଶேమ೔೔ ൌ 	݌ேଵ௜     (3.7) 
When market clear at 	ܿଵሺ݌ଵሻ 	ൌ 	ݕଵ 	ൌ 	ܨଵሺ ଵܹ, ଵܰ௜ሻ, ܿଶሺ݌ଶሻ 	ൌ 	ݕଶ 	ൌ 	ܨଶሺ ଶܹ, ଶܰ௜ሻ, 
Equations (3.4) to (3.7) become, 
݌ଵܨଵௐ	భ െ ݌ௐଵ െ ܥிܨଵௐభ 	ൌ 	0    (3.8) 
݌ଵܨଵேభ౟ 	െ ݌ேଵ݅ െ ܥிܨଵேଵ௜ 	ൌ 	0    (3.9) 
݌ଶܨଶௐଶ 	ൌ 	݌ௐ	   (3.10) 
݌ଶܨଶேଶ௜ 	ൌ 	 ݌ே௜		   (3.11)	
It is obvious that ݌ଶ does not change whether or not considering the social 
welfare. However, there is a difference between the price of good 1, ݌ଵ  when 
considering social welfare and not. Denote the price of good 1 as ݌ଵෞ when taking taking 
social welfare into account and from (6) 
݌1෢ ൌ ݌ௐଵܨଵௐଵ െ ܥி ൌ
݌ேభ೔ଵܨଵேଵ െ ܥி ൐ ݌ଵ 
Since social cost of the environmental damage is included in ݌ଵෞ	. On the one hand, 
policy in such case could be the subsidies to the consumers, which is equal to the social 
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cost, to raise their consumers' surplus. On the other hand, social cost can be internalized by 
subsiding the firm's output to reduce its cost. The solution to the first integration is the 
water embedded in good 1, denoted as ଵܹ. In addition to the water embedded in good 2, 
ଶܹ, the total water used in domestic production of home country is ܹ	̂	 ൌ 	 ሺ ଵܹ	ሻ	̂ ൅
	ሺ ଶܹሻ	̂ Meanwhile, the factor price ratio is as below and still equals to the marginal 
product of input ratio. Therefore, the externality does not affect equality of per dollar 
marginal productivity of each factor.  
ܨଵௐభ	/ܨଵேభ ൌ ݌ௐଵ	/݌ேଵ௜	or  
ிభೈభ
௣ೈ
ൌ ிభಿభ୮ొ౟ 			
Physical water used in production is traced though (8) and (10ሻ,ܹ	 ൌ 	 ଵܹ ൅
ଶܹ 	ൌ ܨଵି ଵ ቀ ௣ೈ௣భି஼ಷቁ ൅ ܨଶି
ଵሺ௣ೈ௣మ ሻ
3.2.3 Open Economy with free trade (countries produce and trade both goods)  
Open economy allows countries to trade; home countries could produce and trade 
both goods. For the water scarce country, I assume it is a small country when it produces 
water-intensive products, therefore, it takes world price as given, or the open economy make 
the price of good 1 drop to the world price, consumer surplus of good 1 increases. New 
world price is denoted as p1. However, the water relative abundant country (foreign country) 
is assumed as a large economy when it produces water-intensive products. Hence, when it 
increase any of its factor input, e.g., water, the output rises, which results that the output 
price/ world price drops ሺ	߲݌ݕ	/߲ܹ ൏ 	0, ߲݌ݕ݅	/߲ ௜ܰ ൏ 	0ሻ , ceteris paribus. And open 
economy does not change the price of good 2, so does the consumer surplus of good 2. 
Home country import the amount of ܯଵ 	ൌ 	 ܿଵ െ ݕଵ	of good 1 from foreign country and 
export ܺଶ 	ൌ 	ݕଶ െ	ܿଶ  to the foreign country. And foreign country import Mଶ∗ ൌ 	 ܿଶ∗ െ
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ݕଶ∗ and export ܺଶ∗ 	ൌ 	ݕଵ∗ െ	ܿଵ∗ . Market clears at ܯଵ ൌ ଵܺ∗  and ܺଶ ൌ ܯଶ∗  Therefore, ܿଵ െ
	ݕଵ 	ൌ ݕଵ∗ െ	ܿଵ∗ and ݕଶ െ ܿଶ 	ൌ 	 ܿଶ∗ െ	ݕଶ∗. 
Welfare of home country in the trade is as the following: 
ߗ௧௥௔ௗ௘ ൌ ݉ܽݔௐ෩ ,ேഢ෪ ሼන ܿଵሺ݌ଵሻ݀ሺ݌ଵሻ
ஶ
௣భ෦భ
൅ න ܿଶሺ݌ଶሻ݀ሺ݌ଶሻ
ஶ
௣మ෦భ
൅ ݌ଵ෦ܨ_1൫ ෩ܹଵ, ෩ܰଵ௜൯ ൅ ݌ଵ෦ܨଶሺ ଶܹ෪ , ෩ܰଶ௜ሻ
െ	݌ௐ	൫ ଵܹ෪ 	൅	 ଶܹ෪ ൯ െ ݌ே௜൫ ෩ܰଵ௜ ൅	 ෩ܰଶ௜൯ െ ܥ ቀܨ	൫ ෩ܹଵ, ෩ܰଵ௜൯ቁሽ 
And foreign country's welfare in the trade is:  
ߗ∗௧௥௔ௗ௘ ൌ ݉ܽݔௐ෩ ,ேഢ෪ ሼන ܿଵ
∗ሺ݌ଵሻ݀ሺ݌ଵሻ
ஶ
௣భ෦భ
൅ න ܿଶ∗ሺ݌ଶሻ݀ሺ݌ଶሻ
ஶ
௣మ෦భ
൅ ݌ଵ෦ܨଵ∗൫ܹ∗෪ ଵ,ܰ∗෪ଵ௜൯
൅ ݌ଵ෦ܨଶ∗൫ܹ∗෪ ଶ,ܰ∗෪ଶ௜൯ െ 	݌ܹ	൫ ଵܹ∗෪ 	൅	ܹ∗෪ ଶ൯ െ ݌ܰ݅൫ ଵܰప∗෪ ൅	ܰ∗෪ଶ௜൯
െ ܥሺܨ	൫ܹ∗෪ ଵ,ܰ∗෪ଵ௜൯ሻሽ	 
F.O.C.s are as the follows:  
݌෤1ܨ෨1ܹ1 െ ܥሚܨ	ܨ෨ܹ1	 ൌ 	 ሺ݌෤1 െ ܥሚܨ	ሻܨ෨1ܹ1	 ൌ 	݌ܹ	    (3.12)  
݌෤1ܨ෨1ܰ െ	ܥሚܨ	ܨ෨ܰ1݅	 ൌ 	 ሺ݌෤1 െ	ܥሚܨ	ሻܨ෨1ܰ1݅	 ൌ 	݌ܰ	    (3.13)  
െܿሺ݌ଶሻ డ௣మడௐమ ൅
డ௣మ
డௐమ ܨଶሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌ଶܨଶௐమ െ ݌ௐ ൌ 0     (3.14) 
െܿሺ݌ଶሻ డ௣మడேమ೔ ൅
డ௣మ
డேమ೔ ܨଶሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌ଶܨଶேమ೔ െ ݌ே೔ ൌ 0      (3.15) 
െܿଵ∗ሺ݌෤ଵሻ డ௣෤భడௐభ∗ ൅
డ௣෤భ
డௐభ∗ ܨଵ
∗ሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌෤ଵܨଵௐభ∗∗ ሺ. ሻ െ ܥிܨௐభ∗∗ ൌ ݌ௐ      (3.16) 
െܿଵ∗ሺ݌෤ଵሻ డ௣෤భడேభ∗ ൅
డ௣෤భ
డேభ∗ ܨଵ
∗ሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌෤ଵܨଵேభ∗∗ ሺ. ሻ െ ܥிܨேభ೔∗ ൌ ݌ே೔     (3.17) 
݌ଶܨଶௐభ∗∗ ሺ. ሻ െ ܥிܨௐమ∗∗ ൌ ݌ௐ         (3.18) 
݌ଶܨଶேమ∗∗ ሺ. ሻ െ ܥிܨேమ೔∗ ൌ ݌ே೔         (3.19)  
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If the country is a small economy of one good production, then it factor price is net 
of the value its marginal productivity and marginal social cost to the environment. In another 
word, the value of the factor’s marginal productivity in a certain good is the sum of the 
factor’s price and its marginal social cost. If the country is a large economy, on the contrary, 
the value of a factor’s marginal productivity is the sum of the factor price and its marginal 
social cost subtract the other country’s marginal consumption value of this factor change. 
Therefore, the value of the factor’s marginal productivity is higher in the commodity 
produced in large country that in small country. Both countries also face budget constraints, 
where home country's budget constraint is:  
݌ଵܿଵ 	൅	݌ଶܿଶ 	ൌ 	݌ଵݕଵ 	൅	݌ଶݕଶ 	ൌ 	݌ଵܨଵሺ. ሻ 	൅	݌ଶܨଶሺ. ሻ		
While foreign's is as follows with free trade (prices of both goods are the same which is the 
world price):   ݌~ଵܿଵ∗ ൅ ݌ଶܿଶ∗ ൌ ݌~ଵܨଵ∗ሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌ଶܨଶ∗ሺ. ሻ 
Open economy expands the demand of good 2 which is from the foreign country 
because the price of good 2 is relatively cheaper than that in the foreign country. Therefore, 
home country mount up its production of good 2 to match such extra demand. Physical 
water amount used in the production can be traced through equation 3.12 ܹ~ଵ ൌ ܨିଵሺ ௣ೈ௣భᇲି஼ಷᇲሻ, 
and equation 3.14: 	ܨଶି ଵሺܿሺ݌ଶሻ డ௣మడௐమ െ
డ௣మ
డௐమ ܨଶሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌ௐሻ/݌ଶ ൌ ଶܹ Therefore, domestic water 
saved from open economy is  
ଵܹ ൅ ଶܹ െܹ
~
ଵ െܹ
~
ଶ
ൌ ܨଵି ଵሺ ݌ௐ݌ଵ െ ܥிሻ ൅ ܨଶି
ଵሺ݌ௐ݌ଶ ሻ െ ܨଵି
ଵሺ ݌ௐ݌ଵ~ െ ܥிᇲ
ሻ െ ܨଶି ଵሺሺܿሺ݌ଶሻ ߲݌ଶ߲ ଶܹ
െ ߲݌ଶ߲ ଶܹ ܨଶሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌ௐሻ/݌ଶሻ 
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Equations (3.12) and (3.13) explains that as long as factor prices do not change, change 
of the value of marginal factor productivity is equal to the change of the value of 
marginal social cost of the factor. For the home country, social welfare will be decreased 
by consumer surplus but gained from producer surplus and less social cost of the 
environment because of using less water during the production process of water-intensive 
good. Domestic government does not have to impose any distortions like tax or subsidies as 
in autarky economy. Instead, the gains and loss from the international trade can be 
mutually compensated. Moreover, since output prices of good 1 (݌ଵ ) and good 2 (݌ଶ) are 
determined by water and non water input, optimal domestic welfare does not guarantee 
optimal global welfare. The global welfare optimization problem is as follows,  
ߗ௧௥௔ௗ௘ ൅ ߗ௧௥௔ௗ௘∗  
s.t. ܿଵ െ ݕଵ ൌ ݕଵ∗ െ ܿଵ∗ and ݕଶ െ ܿଶ ൌ ܿଶ∗ െ ݕଶ∗ 
3.2.4 Open Economy with free trade and each country export the product they have 
comparative advantage in  
               As assumed above, home country is relatively water scarce. Reimer (2012) proved 
that even though some economists opposed using 'virtual water trade' concept to 
international trade because this concept relied on absolute value, there was still a hint of 
comparative advantage embedded in this concept. Hence, when it is an open economy, 
water abundant country (foreign country) produces more water intensive good (good 1) 
than that they consume, and water scarce country (home country) produces more of less 
water intensive good (good 2) than that they consume. Even though completely giving up 
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production of one good might be risky and makes the country vulnerable to this good, for 
water scarce countries like Saudi Arabia, it is not a bad idea to do so.  
ݕଵ∗ ൐ ܿଵ∗	and ݕଶ ൐ ܿଶ 
Home country import the amount of ܯଵ 	ൌ 	 ܿଵ of good 1 from foreign country 
and export	ܺଶ 	ൌ 	ݕଶ െ ܿଶ	to the foreign country. And foreign country import	Mଶ∗ 	ൌ 	 ܿଶ∗ nd export 
Xଵ∗ 	ൌ 	ݕଵ∗ െ ܿଵ∗ Market clear at ܯଵ 	ൌ 	 ଵܺ
∗ and ଵܺ 	ൌ 	ܯଵ
∗
Home country faces its budget 
constraint:  
݌ଵܿଵ 	ൌ 	݌ଶݕଶ െ ݌ଶܿଶ 	ൌ ݌ଶܿଶ∗         (3.20)  
While foreign country's budget constraint is as follows with free trade (prices of 
both goods are the same which is the world price): ݌ଶܿଶ∗ 	ൌ 	݌ଵݕଶ∗ െ ݌ଵܿଶ∗ 	ൌ ݌ଵܿଵ 
In the international trade, both countries produce only what they have comparative 
advantage, therefore, both of them are considered as large economy for the goods they 
produce. Therefore, the domestic factor prices change influence the world price, such that 
డ௣௬
డௐ ൏ 0,
డ௣௬௜డே೔ ൏ 	0	. As the import of water intensive good, the environmental damage is 
exported. In this case, home country does not produce good 1, and all the environmental 
damages from this good are transferred to foreign country. Therefore, even though there 
might be higher producer's surplus and consumer's surplus, yet there is a trade-off of the 
environmental quality. Social welfare of both countries might change.  
The objectives for each country's social planner are formulated as the following. 
Welfare of home country in the trade is :  
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ߗ௏ௐ௧௥௔ௗ௘ ൌ ݉ܽݔௐ,ே೔ ሼන ܿଵሺ݌
^
ଵሻ݀ሺ݌^ଵሻ
ஶ
௣^భ
൅ න ܿሺ݌^ଶሻ݀ሺ݌^ଶሻ
ஶ
௣^మ
൅ ݌ଶܨଶሺ ଶܹ, ଶܰ௜ሻ െ ݌ௐ ଶܹ െ෍݌ே೔ ଶܰ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
ሽ 
and foreign country's welfare in the trade is:  
ߗ௏ௐ௧௥௔ௗ௘∗ ൌ ݉ܽݔௐ,ே೔ ሼන ܿଵ
∗ሺ݌^ଵሻ݀ሺ݌^ଵሻ
ஶ
௣^భ
൅ න ܿଶ∗ሺ݌^ଶሻ݀ሺ݌^ଶሻ
ஶ
௣^మ
൅ ݌ଵܨଵ∗ሺ ଵܹ∗, ଵܰ௜∗ ሻ െ ݌ௐ ଵܹ∗
െ෍݌ே೔ ଵܰ௜∗
௡
௜ୀଵ
െ ܥሺܦሺ ଵܹ∗, ଵܰ௜∗ ሻሻሽ 
The home welfare, therefore, does not include producer's surplus of good 1, costs of 
producing good 1 and the externality of environmental damage. Meanwhile, the foreign 
welfare does not include producer's surplus of good 2 and costs of producing good 2. 
Nevertheless, the social/externality cost from environmental damage increases since it 
produces more of good 1 than autarky scenario. The first order conditions of the optimal 
solution are derived. 
െܿଶሺ݌ଶሻ డ௣మడௐమ ൅
డ௣మ
డௐమ ܨଶሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌ଶܨଶௐమ ൌ ݌ௐ       (3.22) 
െܿଶሺ݌ଶሻ డ௣మడேమ೔ ൅
డ௣మ
డேమ೔ ܨଶሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌ଶܨଶேమ೔ ൌ ݌ே       (3.23) 
െܿଵ∗ሺ݌ଵሻ డ௣భడௐభ∗ ൅
డ௣భ
డௐభ∗ ܨଵ
∗ሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌ଵܨଵௐభ∗∗ ሺ. ሻ െ ܥிܨௐభ∗ ൌ ݌ௐ     (3.24) 
െܿଵ∗ሺ݌ଵሻ డ௣భడேభ∗ ൅
డ௣భ
డேభ∗ ܨଵ
∗ሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌ଵܨଵேభ∗∗ ሺ. ሻ െ ܥிܨேభ೔∗ ൌ ݌ேభ೔    (3.25) 
First of all,߲݌ଵ/߲ ଵܹ∗ marginal price change of water- intensive products in water 
input in foreign county, need to be specified. By the chain rule, ߲݌ଵ/߲ ଵܹ∗is expressed as 
follows:  
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1
߲ܿଵ∗߲݌ଵ ൅
߲ܿଵ߲݌ଵ
ൈ ߲ݕଵ
∗
߲ ଵܹ∗ ܿଵሺ݌ଵሻ ൅ ݌ଵܨଵௐభ∗
∗ ሺ. ሻ െ ܥிܨௐభ∗∗ ൌ ݌ௐ 
Therefore, the market clearing condition (3.24) is simplified as below: ܨିଵሺ ௣ೈ௣భି஼ಷሻ ൅
ܨଶି ଵሺ௣ೈ௣మ ሻ െ ܨ
^
ଶି ଵሺሺܿሺ݌ଶሻ డ௣మడௐమ െ
డ௣మ
డௐమ ܨଶ
^ ሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌ௐሻ/݌ଶሻ  
Define the optimal levels of water usage W2 and non-water usage N2i Hence, optimal 
output level is 	ݕ෤1	 ൌ 	ܨ	ሺ ෩ܹଵ, ଵܰప෪ 	ሻ.  If considering comparative advantage of virtual 
water trade, water is saved for the home country (home country) by the amount of 
ܨିଵሺ ௣ೈ௣భି஼ಷሻ ൅ ܨଶି
ଵሺ௣ೈ௣మ ሻ െ ܨ
^
ଶି ଵሺሺܿሺ݌ଶሻ డ௣మడௐమ െ
డ௣మ
డௐమ ܨଶ
^ ሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌ௐሻ/݌ଶ 
Global welfare maximizing is as the following: 
ߗ௧௥௔ௗ௘ ൅ ߗ௧௥௔ௗ௘∗  
F.O.C.s are as below 
 െܿଶሺ݌ଶሻ డ௣మడௐమ െ ܿଶ
∗ሺ݌ଶሻ డ௣మడௐమ ൅
డ௣మ
డௐమ ܨଶሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌ଶܨଶௐమ െ ݌ௐ ൌ 0    (3.26) 
െܿଶሺ݌ଶሻ డ௣మడேమ െ ܿଶ
∗ሺ݌ଶሻ డ௣మడௐమ ൅
డ௣మ
డேమ ܨଶሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌ଶܨଶேమ െ ݌ே ൌ 0     (3.27) 
െܿଵ∗ሺ݌ଵሻ డ௣భడௐభ∗ െ ܿଵሺ݌ଵሻ
డ௣భ
డௐభ∗ ൅
డ௣భ
డௐభ∗ ܨଵ
∗ሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌ଵܨଵௐభ∗∗ ሺ. ሻ െ ܥிܨௐభ∗ ൌ ݌ௐ   (3.28) 
െܿଵ∗ሺ݌ଵሻ డ௣భడேభ∗ െ ܿଶሺ݌ଶሻ
డ௣భ
డேభ ൅
డ௣భ
డேభ∗ ܨଵ
∗ሺ. ሻ ൅ ݌ଵܨଵேభ∗∗ ሺ. ሻ െ ܥிܨேభ೔∗ ൌ ݌ேభ೔   (3.29) 
With the international market clearing conditions ݕଵ∗െܿଵ∗ 	ൌ 	 ܿଵ  and ݕଶ െ ܿଶ 	ൌ 	 ܿଶ∗ . The 
F.O.C.s are simplified as below, and are the same expression as the ones in the small economy. 
Output prices are not affected by the large countries' inputs.  
݌ଶܨଶௐమ െ ݌ௐ ൌ 0          (3.30) 
݌ଶܨଶேమ െ ݌ே ൌ 0          (3.31) 
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݌ଵܨଵௐభ∗∗ ሺ. ሻ െ ܥிܨௐభ∗ ൌ ݌ௐ         (3.32) 
݌ଵܨଵேభ∗∗ ሺ. ሻ െ ܥிܨேభ೔∗ ൌ ݌ேభ೔         (3.33) 
However, it does not mean global efficiency automatically ignores the input 
effects of large countries on the world output prices as shown in Peterson et al.  (2002). It 
depends on what the functional form is for the production. Conditions (3.30) and (3.31) 
mean zero profit for the non-agricultural product firm.  
3.2.5 Terms of Trade  
               As the trade of "virtual water" from water relatively abundant country to water 
relatively scarce country, the related environmental damage is going to be transferred with 
counter flow. Trade with externalities is one of the features in virtual water trade, Since 
externality or water pollution in this case negatively affects the social welfare, and if the 
total welfare is reduced by 'virtual water' trade, then there must be a compensation, such as 
side payment to the export country (water abundant country). However, side payment is 
not quite politically preferable since it might weaken the country's international bargain 
power. Therefore, terms of trade (TOT) need to be carefully made. The following social 
welfare condition has to be satisfied:  
1.ߗ௩௪௧௥௔ௗ௘ ൒ ߗ௧௥௔ௗ௘ ൒ ߗ௔௨௧௔௥௞௬ 
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2. ߗ௩௪௧௥௔ௗ௘∗ ൒ ߗ௧௥௔ௗ௘∗ ൒ ߗ௔௨௧௔௥௞௬∗  
That is, with virtual water trade, especially with comparative advantage, the 
individual social welfare of each country should not be lower than the one in partial 
trade economy and autarky economy. Therefore, if domestic and global social welfare 
when considering virtual water is greater than the one without considering virtual 
water or the one under autarky, no government policy/instrument is needed. Further, 
instruments could be applied, like tax on water use or subsidies to the farmers who 
used to produce water-intensive commodity. 
3.3. Empirical Application of the Model: The case of Saudi Arabia  
Saudi Arabia had implemented an aggressive wheat production program to 
achieve self-sufficiency in wheat production.  However, in the process it had depleted 
the country's scarce water supplies.  Recently, the country has decided to abandon the 30-
year old wheat production program, and instead, to rely entirely on wheat import by 2016. 
Countries like Saudi Arabia could shift its resources, especially water resources, from 
the production of water-intensive commodities to the production of less water-intensive 
commodities or the products that has much higher water productivity. As long as the 
trade of virtual water is applied, then the country with scarce water have to pay the 
comparative water abundant country for the extra externalities cost (environmental 
damage), ܥ∗ሺܨ∗ܹ∗^ , ௜ܰ∗
^ ሻ െ ܥሺܨ∗ሺܹ∗, ௜ܰ∗ሻሻ.. Virtual water trade is preferable as long 
as total welfare that includes the external cost for home country (welfare minus 
payment to the foreign country for the environmental damage because of the extra 
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production for home country) will not be less than the one in Autarky economy or 
partial trade. 
3.4. Data for the Empirical Model 
Water scarcity already affects every continent. Around 1.2 billion people, i.e., 
almost one-fifth of the world's population, live in areas of physical scarcity, and 500 
million more people are approaching this situation (UNICEF and WHO, 2008). 
Another 1.6 billion people, or almost one quarter of the world's population, face 
economic water shortage primarily in countries that lack the necessary infrastructure to 
take water from rivers and aquifers.  
I choose two trading partners: the water scarce country, Saudi Arabia and the 
United States, which is abundant in physical water and is one of the major wheat 
exporters and oil importers for Saudi Arabia. Two goods are selected: wheat (a water-
intensive product) and petroleum (a less water- intensive product). Water-intensive 
wheat needs green, blue and grey water.  However, since green water is free of charge, I 
only consider blue and grey water. Data are from FAOSTAT, USDA, World Bank and 
EIA.  
To keep the integrity of the simulation model, I choose a ten-year period data of 
every category of water from year 2001 to year 2010, and take the value in 2010 as the 
base value. Since the quantity of value of oil export of Saudi Arabia is so much greater 
than the value of wheat import, and the United States, the wheat export to Saudi 
Arabia is just a small portion of its production, there would be a problem of mismatch 
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of scale. For a two-country model, as per the budget constraint 20 and 21, the value of 
import and export for both countries in terms of these two products should be the same. 
Therefore, I take just a portion of the oil export of Saudi Arabia, which is equivalent 
to the value of wheat import. Foreign country I choose.  
3.5. Simulation model and solution 
In order to keep the model and its results tractable, I present below a simplified 
version of the theoretical models developed in the previous sections, using specific 
functional forms for consumption, production, and social cost.  
ܿଵ ൌ ݇ଵ݌ଵିఎ೎భ , ܿଵ∗ ൌ ݇ଵ∗݌ଵ
ିఎ೎భ∗          (3.34) 
ܿଶ ൌ ݇ଶ݌ଶିఎ೎మ , ܿଶ∗ ൌ ݇ଶ∗݌ଶିఎ೎మ
∗
        (3.35) 
ܿଵ ൅ ܿଵ∗ ൌ ݕଵ∗ ൌ ݇௬భ∗ ܹ∗ఎభܰ∗ଵିఎభ 
ܿଶ ൅ ܿଶ∗ ൌ ݕଶ ൌ ݇௬మܹఎమܰଵିఎమ 
ܥ ൌ ߙݕଵ∗ ൅ ܾ 
First of all, through a log-transformation of the above functions, we can obtain 
simple estimating equations.  For example, the log-linear version of equation (3.34) is,   
݈݊ܿଵ ൌ ݈݊݇ଵ െ ߟ௖భ݈݊݌ଵ ൅ ߝଵ 
The parameters from above equations are then estimated using the data for the study 
countries and the regression estimates are presented in the Table 3-1. The estimated 
regression results match the intuition that the price elasticity of wheat demand is less 
than 1 because it is a necessary good. Price elasticity of crude oil/petroleum demand is 
also less than 1, showing it is also necessary. Both wheat prices and oil prices in Saudi 
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Arabia and United States are all real prices, taking year 2000 as the base year. 
According to IME's report, between 500 and 4,000 liters of water are required to 
produce 1kg of wheat. That is 500,000 to 4,000,000 liters of water needed for 1 metric 
ton wheat production. Higher technology or better water management is wheat-
growing makes less water required for the same harvest. According to Li et al. (2007), 
Crop Water Productivity (CWP) is 0.589 kg/L in US, and 1.066 kg/L in Saudi Arabia. 
ߟଵ , and ߟଶ  in represents the productivity of the water and non-water inputs 
respectively. Per Ali (2002), US has the water input cost share, ߟଵ∗ = 0.004 and ߟଶ in Saudi 
Arabia is assumed to be 0.00001. Normalize the price of non-water input, taking 2000 
price as the base value of 1. Average social cost is taken from Tegtmeier and Duffy, 
2004. Linear regression also results the marginal social cost and fix social cost. Using 
the parameters below, I estimated the international equilibrium water and non-water 
factor inputs for oil and wheat production.  By plugging those equations back to (3.30) 
to (3.33). ଵܹ∗ , ଵܰ∗  and ଶܹ	 ଶܰ  in the simulation model are solved explicitly.       
Equilibrium input levels are obtained through the simulated model, then numerical values 
of each optimal level are calculated by the parameters in Table 3-1. 
 
Table 3-1 Parameters and values 
Parameter Description Value Source 
ߟ௖భ SA Price elasticity of demand for 
wheat  0.001 
Estimated from 
data 
ߟ௖భ∗ US Price elasticity of demand for 
wheat  0.03 
Assumed  
ߟ௖మ SA Price elasticity of demand for 
oil 
0.218 Estimated 
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ߟ௖మ∗ US Price elasticity of demand for 
oil 
0.008 Estimated 
݈݊݇ଵ Log value of Wheat consumption 
constant in SA 
17.13 Estimated 
݈݊݇ଵ∗ Log value of Wheat consumption 
constant in US 
4.1 Estimated 
݈݊݇ଶ Log value of oil consumption 
constant in SA 
19.54 Estimated 
݈݊݇ଶ∗ Log value of oil consumption 
constant in US 
22.74 Estimated 
ߟଶ Water productivity in oil production 
in SA 
0.00001 Assumed 
݇௬భ∗  Production technology constant of 
oil in US 
0.01 Calculated from 
assumption 
݈݊݇௬మ Production technology constant of 
oil in SA 
0.03 Calculated from 
assumption 
ߟଵ∗ Water productivity in wheat 
production in US 
0.004 Calculated from 
assumption 
ߙ Marginal social cost 4.3 Estimated 
b Fix social cost 354000000 Estimated 
 Table 3-1Parameters and values (continued) 
               
ଵܹ∗ ൌ
ሼ ௞భ
௞೤భ∗ ሾ
೛ಿആభ∗
೛ೈሺభషആభ∗ ሻሿ
ആభ∗
ሾ ௣ಿ
௞೤భ∗ ሺଵିఎభ∗ሻሾ
೛ಿആభ∗
೛ೈሺభషആభ∗ ሻሿ
ആభ∗
൅ ߙሿିఎ೎భ ൅ ௞భ∗
௞೤భ∗ ሾ
೛ಿആభ∗
೛ೈሺభషആభ∗ ሻሿ
ആభ∗
ሾ ௣ಿ
௞೤భ∗ ሺଵିఎభ∗ሻሾ
೛ಿആభ∗
೛ೈሺభషആభ∗ሻሿ
ആభ∗
൅
ߙሿିఎ೎భ∗ ሽ ௣ಿఎభ௣ೈሺଵିఎభሻ 
ଵܰ∗ ൌ ݇ଵ݇௬భ∗ ሾ ݌ேߟଵ
∗
݌ௐሺ1 െ ߟଵ∗ሻሿ
ఎభ∗
ሾ ݌ே
݇௬భ∗ ሺ1 െ ߟଵ∗ሻሾ ݌ேߟଵ
∗
݌ௐሺ1 െ ߟଵ∗ሻሿ
ఎభ∗
൅ ߙሿିఎ೎భ
൅ ݇ଵ
∗
݇௬భ∗ ሾ ݌ேߟଵ
∗
݌ௐሺ1 െ ߟଵ∗ሻሿ
ఎభ∗
ሾ ݌ே
݇௬భ∗ ሺ1 െ ߟଵ∗ሻሾ ݌ேߟଵ
∗
݌ௐሺ1 െ ߟଵ∗ሻሿ
ఎభ∗
൅ ߙሿିఎ೎భ∗  
ଶܹ ൌ ሼ݇ଶ݇௬ଶఎ೎మିଵሾ
݌ே
ሺ1 െ ߟଶሻሿ
ఎమఎ೎మିఎమିఎ೎మሾ ߟଶ݌ௐሿ
ఎమఎ೎మିఎమ
൅ ݇ଶ∗݇௬ଶఎ೎మ
∗ ିଵሾ ݌ேሺ1 െ ߟଶሻሿ
ఎమఎ೎మ∗ ିఎమିఎ೎మ∗ ሾ ߟଶ݌ௐሿ
ఎమఎ೎మ∗ ିఎమሽ ݌ேߟଵ݌ௐሺ1 െ ߟଵሻ 
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ଶܰ ൌ ݇ଶ݇௬ଶఎ೎మିଵሾ
݌ே
ሺ1 െ ߟଶሻሿ
ఎమఎ೎మିఎమିఎ೎మሾ ߟଶ݌ௐሿ
ఎమఎ೎మିఎమ
൅ ݇ଶ∗݇௬ଶఎ೎మ
∗ ିଵሾ ݌ேሺ1 െ ߟଶሻሿ
ఎమఎ೎మ∗ ିఎమିఎ೎మ∗ ሾ ߟଶ݌ௐሿ
ఎమఎ೎మ∗ ିఎమ 
The solution suggests that if production function is Cobb-Douglas and social 
cost is a linear function of production, the world output price for any country, even for 
the large country, is not related to the input. On another word, the power of the large 
country to change world price can be ignored. 
Thirdly, by plugging these optimal input levels back into the simulation 
model, the optimal levels of consumption, production, and welfare are solved.   
3.6. Results  
This section presents an empirical application of the above model to the 
water scarcity problem of Saudi Arabia.  If VW trade is considered and comparative 
advantage applies, Saudi Arabia, a water scarce country, may consider cutting back on 
growing wheat crops that it does not have comparative advantage in, and import instead 
to meet its domestic demand. On the contrary, if VW trade or comparative advantage of 
water use is not considered, Saudi Arabia would still produce wheat crops domestically, 
and may also import some in order to match its demand of wheat. Therefore, the 
difference between water embedded in completely imported wheat and that in 
domestically produced wheat is the amount of water saved considering comparative 
advantage in VW trade. (see Table 3-2). Sensitivity analysis shows the water productivity 
ratio in both wheat and oil production is sensitive (Changes of parameters keeping 
others constant). 
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From the results, it is clear that if there is no international trade, growing 
water intensive wheat crops for Saudi Arabia makes water shortage more severe 
because of the increasing domestic consumption (see Table 3-3). From 2008, Saudi 
Arabia grows much less wheat and chooses to import from foreign countries. Data 
shows that after a reduction in wheat production, considering virtual water trade with 
no trade distortion (totally give up production of water intensive good-wheat, and let 
import support domestic wheat consumption), and then water is saved by a great 
amount. 
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Table 3-2 Actual domestic production and import of Wheat and oil in Saudi Arabia and United State 
Variable Country Commodity Units Values 
Actual annual average of 2008 to 2010 
Domestic production SA Wheat 1000 tons 1496 
 USA Wheat 1000 tons 62814 
 SA Oil Million barrel 3801 
 USA Oil Million barrel 3331 
Imports SA Wheat 1000 tons 1254 
 USA Wheat 1000 tons -35692 
 SA Oil Million barrel -3004 
 USA Oil Million barrel 3658 
Average Water saved (partial trade 
compared to autarky) 
SA Wheat Million L 12350 
Average Water saved (VW trade 
compared to autarky) 
SA Wheat Million L 1160 
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Table 3-3 Physical water saved for Saudi Arabia by importing wheat (From Observed value) 
Year 
Domestic wheat production ݕଵ 
(Unit: 1000 Ton) 
Consumption ܿଵ 
(Unit: 1000 Ton) 
 Import 
(Unit: 
1000 Ton) 
Water saved by 
partial import 
(Unit: million 
L) 
Water saved by Fully 
import 
 (Unit: million L)) 
2001 2081 2050 -31 -29 1896 
2002 2436 2150 -286 -264 1988 
2003 2524 2250 -274 -253 2081 
2004 2775 2350 -425 -393 2173 
2005 2648 2450 -198 -183 2266 
2006 2630 2500 -130 -12 2312 
2007 2558 2550 -8 -7 2358 
2008 1985 2650 664 614 2451 
2009 1152 2750 1597 1477 2543 
2010 1349 2850 1500 1388 2636 
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 At the equilibrium, world price from the model is lower than the data on average as 
shown in Table 3-4. This is true intuitively since world trade will lower the output 
price. The increase of foreign demand will raise domestic production , and the supply 
curve will shift outward which cause price drop.  
Table 3-4 Price comparison: Equilibrium price VS observed price 
Year ݌ଵ 
(simulated) 
݌ଵ 
(observed) 
݌ଶ 
(simulated) 
݌ଶ 
(observed) 
2001 107.14 98.84 40.21 22.54 
2002 109.03 124.76 40.92 23.64 
2003 111.28 116.50 41.81 29.57 
2004 114.94 112.61 43.25 40.81 
2005 117.52 110.92 44.27 57.12 
2006 120.29 135.00 45.32 69.42 
2007 125.04 196.86 47.11 80.42 
2008 131.70 195.14 49.72 120.00 
2009 133.80 137.80 50.62 73.20 
2010 134.87 159.66 51.01 97.80 
Average 120.56 138.80 45.42 61.45 
 
And the effect of Saudi Arabia’s social welfare and Global welfare from VW 
trade is shown in Table 3-5. It is clear that from Table 3-5 without any government 
distortion, both Saudi Arabia’s and world’s social welfare increases with VW trade. 
Therefore, VW trade will automatically compensate the wheat crop growers by the gains 
from the social cost reduction. 
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Table 3-5 Local welfare change VS. Global welfare change (From observed value to 
optimal VW trade level)      (Unit: Billion $) 
Year SA WELFARE 
GAIN US WELFARE 
WORLD 
WELFARE 
2001 57536 -114 57422 
2002 67338 218 67555 
2003 69767 72 69839 
2004 76718 -32 76685 
2005 73203 -91 73112 
2006 72705 203 72909 
2007 70707 994 71701 
2008 54888 877 55764 
2009 31857 56 31913 
2010 37299 346 37645 
                
3.7. Conclusion  
                For agricultural production, other than increase in the efficiency of 
irrigation, VW trade is another way to save water. As the trade of virtual water from 
water-abundant country to water-scarce country, the related environmental damage is 
going to be transferred with counter flow. Trade with externalities is one of the 
features in virtual water trade. How to calculate the external cost/ social cost is the key 
to figure out the local and global social welfare. This paper only considered the 
environmental cost as discussed in Tegtmeier and Duffy, 2004. However, it will be 
more accurate if taking the opportunity cost of water in other uses and user cost/ 
scarcity rent for the future use into consideration. Since externality or water pollution 
in this case negatively affects the social welfare, and if the totally welfare is reduced by 
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VW trade, then there must be a compensation, such as side payment to the export country 
(water abundant country). It is not wise for countries like Saudi Arabia, which is a 
water scarce country but still has a very high growth of wheat production, since they 
will face water shortage faster. In order for sustainable water use and economic growth, 
it is more preferable for those countries to shift the production of water-intensive goods 
to that of less water-intensive good, or that with much higher value of water 
productivity. Therefore, terms of trade (TOT) need to be carefully made. My empirical 
test shows that VW trade not only saves a huge amount of water, but it avoids the need 
for government interference for the social welfare, since both local and global welfare 
increases through VW trade. This paper also provides a methodology for calculating 
input price, especially water price that consists of social cost. Nevertheless, irrigation 
water for crops includes blue, green and grey water, and it is difficult to convert the value 
of all three types of water into one. If such conversion could be developed in the future 
study, the local and global welfare gain or loss from VW trade will be more accurate. 
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GLOSSARY 
               Blue water: Fresh surface and groundwater, in other words, the water in 
freshwater lakes, rivers and aquifers. 
                Green water: The precipitation on land that does not run of or recharge the 
groundwater but is stored in the soil or temporarily stays on top of the soil or 
vegetation. Eventually, this part of precipitation evaporates or transpires through 
plants. Green water can be made productive for crop growth (although not all green 
water can be taken up by crops, because there will always be evaporation from the 
soil and because not all periods of the year or areas are suitable for crop growth).  
Grey Water: is defined as wastewater generated showers and baths, which can be 
recycled on-site for uses such as WC flushing, land irrigation and constructed wetlands. 
Grey water often includes discharge from laundry, dishwashers and kitchen sinks. It 
differs from the discharge of WC’s, which is designated sewage, or black water to 
indicate it contains human waste.  
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CHAPTER 4 SUMMARY 
Growing water scarcity is one of the fundamental problems facing humanity.  
This dissertation addressed three different economic problems relating to managing 
scarce water resources.  The first chapter analyzed the factors that influence the 
altruistic behavior of the current generation on the availability of water for their 
offspring irrespective of their intentions. It looks at the trade-offs between three types 
of bequests—monetary, water resource, and individual’s contribution to pollution 
abatement. It explains how different economic, demographic and environmental 
factors could influence the degree of parental altruism, and therefore, the amount of 
water allocated during multiple time periods. The study shows that there may be a gap 
in the amount of resource bequest between private individuals and a social planner.  A 
mixture of different policy instruments is suggested to close this gap.  On the one 
hand, raising the interest rate for individuals will make them lower their current 
consumption of private goods, and in turn, save money towards pollution abatement 
or monetary bequest. In addition, a lump sum subsidy could also promote individuals’ 
contribution towards pollution abatement.  On the other hand, a lump sum tax or fine 
to the firm that causes the pollution would force the firm to advance its technology to 
decrease the pollution level.  The above combination of policies result in increased 
water bequest by promoting water conservation in industries and pollution abatement 
without compromising the direction current consumption. 
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So far, there is no river sharing agreement between China and India, even 
though there exists an ongoing water sharing conflict between the two countries. The 
second chapter studies the water allocation of Brahmaputra River shared by those two 
countries when the water rights do not exist. Traditional side payment is not 
politically appealing for the victim country risking a reputation of being a weak 
negotiator. India, in a geographically weaker position to bargain, expects China share 
water in drought season and control flood in wet season. This study uses the 
interconnected game, combining water-sharing game, in which China has advantage 
on water sharing/controlling in exchange for side payment, and trading game, in 
which India has advantage on approving China to invest on its infrastructure in 
exchange of China importing iron ore from India. As a result, India exercises the 
combined strategies in order to force China to share/control water without side 
payments under the condition of either drought season or wet season. 
 
As global warming exacerbates water shortage, it is essential for the countries, 
which are water scarce to enhance the capability of handling natural shocks. For 
example, cotton growing, one of the largest projects in Sub-Saharan African countries, 
requires strict natural conditions like rainfall or enough irrigation. Nonetheless, water 
is what Sub-Saharan African countries lack the most. It is not wise to concentrate on 
the cotton growing in the long term. Virtual water (water embedded in producing a 
commodity) trade will solve this contradiction. From the theory of comparative 
advantage, countries like Sub-Saharan African countries should import cotton, a water 
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intensive good, instead of growing the crop. A two-country, two-product trade model 
developed in the third chapter uses data from World Bank, FAO, USDA and other 
sources and calculates the welfare gains by virtual water trade between Saudi Arabia 
and United States (Saudi Arabia import wheat from and export oil to US), including 
the consumer’s surplus, producer’s surplus and benefit from dodging the risk of 
economic loss by drought. This study also proves that without government 
intervention, both countries would still achieve trade-related economic welfare goals 
and water-related environmental goals. Therefore, the African countries may produce 
the goods that they have comparative advantage without consuming a huge amount of 
water, such as tourism and related industry.  
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